Disabilityqueer: Federal Disability Rights Protection for Transgender People by Barry, Kevin M.
Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal
Volume 16
Issue 1 Yale Human Rights and Development Journal Article 1
2013
Disabilityqueer: Federal Disability Rights
Protection for Transgender People
Kevin M. Barry
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Yale
Human Rights and Development Law Journal by an authorized editor of Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact julian.aiken@yale.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kevin M. Barry, Disabilityqueer: Federal Disability Rights Protection for Transgender People, 16 Yale Hum. Rts. & Dev. L.J. (2013).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj/vol16/iss1/1
Disabilityqueer: Federal Disability Rights
Protection for Transgender People
Kevin M. Barry*
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) does not protect everyone. It
notably excludes people with Gender Identity Disorder (GID), an impair-
ment involving the misalignment between one's anatomy and gender
identity. Many would say this is as it should be - gender nonconforming
people are not impaired and so they should not be covered by disability
law. But this argument misapprehends the reason that GID was excluded
from the ADA in the first place.
GID was excluded from the ADA because, in 1989, a small handful of
senators believed that gender nonconformity - like pedophilia, pyromania,
and kleptomania -was morally harmful to the community. In the elev-
enth hour of a marathon floor debate, and in the absence of an organized
transgender lobby, the ADA's sponsors and disability rights advocates re-
luctantly agreed to sacrifice GID and nine other mental impairments in
exchange for passage in the Senate. The fact that Congress went out of its
way to exclude GID, along with nine mental impairments that involve
some harm to oneself or others, sends a strong symbolic message: people
with GID have no civil rights worthy of respect. The ADA is a moral
code, and people with GID its moral castaways.
In 2008, when Congress decided to expand the ADA's definition of "disa-
bility" to protect more people, things should have been different for people
with GID. Sadly, they were not. Instead of removing the GID exclusion
once and for all, Congress enshrined its moral opposition to people with
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GID by preserving the exclusion. The ADA's message to people with
GID, and to the transgender community more broadly, is now clearer than
ever: nearly twenty years after the passage of the ADA, people with GID
are still despicable and even dangerous, and therefore undeserving of legal
protection. The ADA's moral code remains.
In order to achieve true equality, transgender advocacy must rebut the
moral case against transgender people. The ADA should play a promi-
nent role in this project because the ADA's GID exclusion is the moral
case against transgender people. The ADA should be righted once more
through passage of a modest bill, the "ADA Inclusion Act," which re-
moves GID from the ADA's list of excluded impairments.
I. INTRODUCTION
Rachel Maddow. Jerry Sandusky. Chaz Bono. Although the ADA
Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA) expanded the ADA's definition of dis-
ability to include medical impairments that are not typically thought of as
"disabling,"' it left intact the exclusion of those who are gay, lesbian, or bi-
sexual, those with pedophilia and other sexual disorders, and those who
are transgender. 2 Many will say that this is as it should be.
Being gay, lesbian, or bisexual, after all, is not a medical impairment. In
1974, the American Psychiatric Association removed same-sex orientation
from its standard classification of mental disorders, known as the Diagnos-
tic and Statistical Manual (DSM).3 Because same-sex orientation is not an
1. Kevin Barry, Toward Universalism: What the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 Can and Can't
Do for Disability Rights, 31 BERKELEY J. EMp. & LAB. L. 203, 208 (2010) [hereinafter Barry, Toward
Universalism] (discussing the ADA Amendments Act's protection of "nearly everyone from
discrimination based on impairments" under the third prong and the relaxation of the "sub-
stantial limitation" requirement under the first and second prongs).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 12211 (2006). "Transgender" is an umbrella term that refers to those who are
gender nonconforming. See Paisley Currah et al., Introduction, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS xiv
(2006). Generally speaking, it includes those diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder (GID),
as well as those without the diagnosis "whose gender identity or expression does not conform
to the social expectations for their assigned sex at birth." Id.
3. HERB KUTCHINS & STUART A. KIRK, MAKING US CRAZY: DSM: THE PSYCHIATRIC BIBLE
AND THE CREATION OF MENTAL DISORDERS 71-72 (1997). See generally About DSM-5, AM.
PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N DSM-5 DEv. http://www.dsm5.org/about/pages/default.aspx (last visit-
ed Nov. 7, 2012) ("[DSM]" is the standard classification of mental disorders used by mental
health professionals in the United States and contains a listing of diagnostic criteria for every
psychiatric disorder recognized by the U.S. healthcare system."). Although the DSM "was de-
veloped for clinical, public health, and research purposes"-not legal ones-it nevertheless
"has been recognized as an important reference by courts" and, according to the EEOC, "is
relevant for identifying [mental] disorders." Proposed Revision, Definition ofa Mental Disorder,
AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N DSM-5 DEV. Proposed revisions are no longer available online, but are
on file with the author. Please see dsm5.org for the final version of the rule. [hereinafter Mental
Disorder, DSM-5 Proposed Revision]; What is a "mental impairment" under the ADA?, EEOC, No-
tice No. 915.002, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND
2 [Vol. 16
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impairment, the argument goes, it should not be covered by the ADA. Ra-
chel Maddow, for example, who is openly lesbian and the host of MSNBC's
primetime news show, "The Rachel Maddow Show," 4 is excluded from the
ADA's definition of disability because she has no medical impairment. The
ADA should no more protect her, one might reasonably argue, than it
should protect people with brown eyes, short legs, or dark hair. 5 These are
characteristics, not impairments, and therefore not the stuff of disability
protection.
By contrast, pedophilia, the sexual attraction to prepubescent children,
remains an impairment under the DSM and few would argue that it should
not be.6 But disability coverage for pedophiles is another matter; one might
reasonably argue that the ADA should not extend to pedophiles because
they threaten the safety of one of our most precious resources -our future.7
Jerry Sandusky, for example, who is the former defensive coordinator for
the Penn State football team and was arrested in 2011 for sexually abusing
eight boys over a 15-year period,8 has a medical impairment alright. He,
too, is excluded from the ADA's definition of disability, but for a very dif-
ferent reason than Rachel Maddow. He is excluded because he is morally
depraved and therefore undeserving of disability protection.9
PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES (1997) available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/psych.html.
4. Jessica Pressler, The Dr. Maddow Show, N.Y. MAC. Nov. 2, 2008, http://nymag.com/
news/media/51822/.
5. 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. (2010) ("The definition of the term 'impairment' does not include
physical characteristics such as eye color, hair color, left-handedness, or height, weight, or
muscle tone that are within 'normal' range and are not the result of a physiological disorder.").
6. Pedophilic Disorder: Proposed Revision, AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N DSM-5 DEv. Proposed re-
visions are no longer available online, but are on file with the author. Please see dsm5.org for
the final version of the rule.
7. This is not to say that reasonable arguments cannot also be made for disability coverage
of pedophiles. See infra note 189.
8. Mark Viera, Former Coach at Penn State Is Charged With Abuse, N. Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/06/sports/ncaafootball/former-coach-at-penn-state-is-
charged-with-abuse.html.
9. One might reasonably argue that gay, lesbian, and bisexual people were excluded from
the ADA not because legislators believed they were not impaired, but rather because legisla-
tors believed that they, too, were morally suspect. Much of the ADA's legislative history, in-
cluding the original ADA bill passed by the Senate, supports this argument. See Ruth Colker,
Homophobia, AIDS Hysteria, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 8 J. GENDER RACE & JusT. 33,
44-46, 49-50 (2004) [hereinafter Homophobia] (discussing ADA's legislative history). Neverthe-
less, because the final version of the ADA clarified that "homosexuality and bisexuality are not
impairments and as such are not disabilities," the text of the law supports a clear distinction in
the reasoning for excluding homosexuality and bisexuality, on the one hand, and a host of oth-
er conditions, on the other. 42 U.S.C. § 12211 (2005). See also infra notes 130-31 and accompany-
ing text. Cf Katrina C. Rose, Where the Rubber Left the Road: The Use and Misuse of History in the
Quest for The Federal Employment Non-Discrimination Act, 18 TEMPLE POL'L & CIv'L RTS. L. REV.
397, 436 n.199 (2009) (quoting Steve Smith, a lobbyist for the Human Rights Campaign Fund at
time of the ADA's passage, who praised the ADA exclusions; and Peri Jude Radecic, who
agreed with the ADA's exclusion of homosexuality and bisexuality but noted that "as far as
the other categories are concerned, I think that anytime that people are removed from protec-
tions, I don't necessarily think that's a good situation. I'm not happy anyone is excluded from
3
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Gender Identity Disorder (GID), which involves the misalignment be-
tween one's anatomy and gender identity, is a harder case.' 0 According to
proposed changes to the DSM, which will take effect in 2013, people with
GID experience, or are at risk of experiencing, distress if they do not receive
the right support, ranging from talk therapy to pharmacological and surgi-
cal interventions." The fact that GID remains a listed DSM diagnosis, cou-
pled with the fact that having GID has nothing to do with hurting people,12
would appear to favor disability coverage under the ADA. But some in the
transgender community -echoing the call of gay, lesbian, and bisexual
people over thirty years ago -believe that GID is not a mental impairment
and therefore has no business being in the DSM.13 Accordingly, one might
argue, GID has no business being in the ADA either. GID sits at the uneasy
crossroads of pathology and difference.
While reasonable arguments can be made for the exclusion of GID un-
der the ADA, the ADA's current exclusion of GID is not a reasonable one.14
GID is explicitly excluded from the ADA not because people with GID are
not impaired (Rachel Maddow), but rather because, in 1989, several mem-
bers of Congress believed that people with GID were morally bankrupt,
dangerous, and sick (Jerry Sandusky). The ADA became a moral code sep-
arating the deserving disabled from the subjects of scorn, with people with
GID falling squarely into the latter camp. Chaz Bono, for example, a
transgender man, and the child of Sonny Bono and Cher, who danced his
way into American's living rooms two years ago, is not protected by the
ADA.15 Whether or not one believes that Chaz Bono has an impairment is
beside the point-the ADA says that he does have an impairment, but that
the bill"). Peri Jude Radecicwas a lobbyist for the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force at the
time of the ADA's passage. See Peri Jude Radecic Takes Over as Executive Director of the Arizona
Center for Disability Law, ARIZONA CENTER FOR DIsABILITY LAW, (May 29, 2007),
http://www.acdl.com/PR52907.htm.
10. See Gender Dysphoria in Adolescents or Adults: Proposed Revision, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N
DSM-5 DEV. Proposed revisions are no longer available online, but are on file with the author.
Please see dsm5.org for the final version of the rule [hereinafter Gender Dysphoria, DSM-5 Pro-
posed Revision].
11. Id.
12. Not everyone would agree with this statement. Those in an intimate relationship with
someone who "comes out" as transgender might say otherwise. But as physically mature,
consenting adults, their hurt is different in kind from that of a prepubescent child.
13. See Judith Butler, Undiagnosing Gender, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 274.
14. See L. Camille H6bert, Transforming Transsexual and Transgender Rights, 15 WM. & MARY
J. WOMEN & L. 535, 540-41 (2009) ("While one might argue for the exclusion of certain condi-
tions from the definition of disability as justified by not wanting to pathologize certain indi-
viduals and conditions, this does not appear to have been the motivation of Congress.") (cita-
tion omitted).
15. Chaz Bono was a cast member of ABC's "Dancing with the Stars" in 2011. Elizabeth
Flock, Chaz Bono on 'Dancing With the Stars' puts Transgender Rights in Spotlight, WASH. POST
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he, like Jerry Sandusky, is not morally deserving of protection.
The ADAAA could have changed things for people with GID, but it did
not do so. In fact, by changing nearly everything about the definition of
disability except the ADA's list of exclusions, the ADAAA appears to ratify
the ADA's moral disapprobation of people with GID. Law can sometimes
create the very thing it seeks to dismantle, and the ADA is a case in point.
By expanding the definition of disability, the ADAAA signaled that
nearly everyone, not just those traditionally considered "disabled," should
be protected from discrimination based on impairment. The newly amend-
ed ADA's scope of coverage is nearly universal. Accordingly, the ADA
does not protect "those" people with stigmatized impairments that impose
severe functional limitations; it now protects all of us who are treated un-
fairly based on impairment, whether or not our impairments are typically
thought of as disabilities. Like the "Genderqueer" who blur the boundaries
between gender's perceived poles of male and female, the newly amended
ADA is "disabilityqueer," blurring the line between the nondisabled and
the disabled - between the healthy "us" and the unfortunate "them."1 6
But by maintaining the GID exclusion, the ADAAA cemented GID's
last-place position in the hierarchy of mental impairments. Now more than
ever, the ADA "disables" people with GID.
While the ADAAA's preservation of GID's place in the hierarchy of im-
16. The newly amended ADA is disabilityqueer in the sense that its expanded definition of
"disability" protects almost any one of us who is treated adversely based on an impairment -
even those whose impairments are not typically thought of as disabling. See infra notes 160-67.
For example, under the amended ADA, a person with controlled asthma, epilepsy, diabetes, or
anxiety, who is refused an accommodation, or a person fired because of a bad back, ankle inju-
ry, carpal tunnel syndrome, or high-functioning autism, is "disabled." By the same token,
those who comprise this vastly expanded group of people now considered "disabled" under
the ADA are, themselves, disabilityqueer; they are "disabled" in the eyes of the law but are not
typically considered to be "disabled" by the rest of society. In this way, disabilityqueer refers
to both the laws and the people who blur the boundaries between disabled and nondisabled.
"Disabilityqueer" is closely related to the concept of "bi-ability" articulated by Professor
Ruth Colker. See Ruth Colker, Bi: Race, Sexual Orientation, Gender, and Disability, 56 OHIo ST.
L.J. 1, 1 n.4 (1995). According to Professor Colker, "bi-ability" refers to those who are not cov-
ered by disability law but who nevertheless experience disadvantage based on their impair-
ments, including those not typically considered to be disabled (e.g., a person with controlled
asthma, epilepsy, or diabetes; an obese person who cannot fit into a movie theater seat; a child
with "strabismus (commonly known as crossed eyes)" who lacks depth perception). Id. at 58-
59, 61-62. Such people are "neither disabled [under the law] nor able-bodied" -they are in
between. Id. at 1 n.4. Under the pre-amendments ADA, there were many bi-abled.
"Disabilityqueer," on the other hand, refers to those who are covered by disability law but are
not typically considered to be disabled (e.g., people with carpal tunnel syndrome, ankle inju-
ries, back injuries, high-functioning autism, and so on). By expanding the definition of disabil-
ity under the ADA's first prong and covering nearly all people under the "regarded-as" prong,
the 2008 amendments to the ADA reduce the number of bi-abled and increase the number of
disabilityqueer. See also Elizabeth F. Emens, Disabling Attitudes: U.S. Disability Law and the
ADA Amendments Act, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 205, 223-25 & n.92 (2012) (preferring term
"bidisability" over "bi-ability," and discussing ADAAA's purported conversion of "many of
the bidisabled into the legal category of disability").
5
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pairments is understandable as a political matter, it is unfortunate. GID
was originally excluded from the ADA for moral reasons: "transgender is
bad." But times have changed. The transgender rights movement has
found its voice. Transgender people have won significant legal battles at
the federal, state, and local levels, including battles before the U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, which ruled in April 2012 that
transgender discrimination is "sex" discrimination under Title VII.17 And
Chaz Bono is dancing with the stars. At long last, transgender is becoming
good.'8
As one scholar recently put it, "[[federal law has an important expres-
sive function, especially concerning the messages it sends about disadvan-
taged groups."' 9 While protection of transgender people under existing
federal and state "sex" discrimination laws and state "gender identity" dis-
crimination laws is an essential part of making transgender "good," it does
not erase the stain in federal disability law that likens people with GID to
people who hurt others and burn and steal things. It does not eliminate the
fact that federal disability law stigmatizes transgender people. Removing
the ADA's intractable GID exclusion should be part of the project of mak-
ing transgender good. The ADA's definition of disability should be righted
once more.
This Article begins with a brief introduction to the ADA and its com-
prehensive prohibition of disability discrimination. Next, this Article dis-
cusses the ADA's legislative history and the untold back-door deal that re-
sulted in the exclusion of GID. Here, my goal is to unmask, to expose why
exactly the ADA protects all physical impairments but only some mental
impairments - the ones we pity, not the ones we despise. 20
I then turn the clock forward seventeen years to the negotiations that
culminated in passage of the ADAAA. I discuss why the Amendments
maintained the ADA's GID exclusion despite its broad expansion of the
definition of disability, the emergence of a powerful transgender lobby, and
growing support for transgender people in popular culture and under state
and federal law.21
17. Macy, EEOC Appeal No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995 (April 20, 2012).
18. This is not to say that transgender people do not still have a long way to go. See, e.g.,
JAIME M. GRANT ET AL., INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL TRANSGENDER
DISCRIMINATION SURVEY 2-8 (2011) available at http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/
reports/reports/ntds full.pdf [hereinafter "INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN"] (documenting rampant
discrimination against transgender people in education, employment, family life, public ac-
commodations, housing, health care, jails, interactions with police, and obtaining ID docu-
ments); Shannon Price Minter, Do Transsexuals Dream of Gay Rights? Getting Real About
Transgender Inclusion, in TRANSGENDER RIGHT, supra note 2, at 146-50 (discussing reluctance of
mainstream LGB movement to accept transgender people).
19. Michael Waterstone, Returning Veterans and Disability Law, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1081,
1122 (2010).
20. See infra Part II.
21. See infra Part III.
6 [Vol. 16
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This Article then looks to the future, and considers what, if anything,
ought to be done about the ADA's exclusion of GID. After discussing some
likely counter-arguments from the transgender community, this Article
concludes that the ADA's definition of disability should be amended to
provide federal disability rights protection for people with GID.22
II. A COMPREHENSIVE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
In order to understand the ADA's past and present (and recommenda-
tions for its future), some brief background is in order. The ADA is a com-
prehensive civil rights law that prohibits discrimination based on disability
in a range of areas, including private employment (Title I), governmental
benefits and services (Title II), and places of public accommodation (Title
1II).2 In order for people to claim protection under the ADA, they must
show that they have a "disability" as defined by the statute. 24 Simply put, a
person can show that he or she is disabled - and therefore protected under
the ADA -if that person (1) actually has, (2) has a record of having, or (3) is
regarded by others as having a "physical or mental impairment that sub-
stantially limits one or more major life activities."2
Congress intended this definition to be interpreted broadly. The word
"impairment," for example, is defined broadly under the ADA's regula-
tions to include virtually any physiological or mental disorder.26 And the
third prong of the definition of disability (the "regarded-as" prong), which
covers those whose impairments are not substantially limiting and even
non-existent, was intended to be a catch-all for those not covered under the
first and second prongs.27
When compared with the definition of disability under the Social Securi-
ty Act, the breadth of the ADA's intended scope of coverage becomes clear.
The Social Security Act provides cash benefits to people who cannot work
22. See infra Part IV.
23. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-17 (workplace); §§
12131-65 (state and local government); §§ 12181-89 (public accommodations) (2006); see also
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336 ("An Act To establish a clear and
comprehensive prohibition of discrimination on the basis of disability.").
24. See id. at § 12102(2)(A)-(C).
25. Id. at § 12102(2)(A)-(C)); see also Kevin Barry, Exactly What Congress Intended?, 17
EMPLOYEE RTs. & EMPLOYMENT POL'Y J. (forthcoming 2013) [hereinafter, Congress Intended].
26. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (2012) ("Physical or mental impairment means- (1) [any phys-
iological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or
more body systems..." or "(2) [any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retarda-
tion, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.");
see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and Disability, 86 VA. L. REV. 397, 407 (2000)
(stating that "impairment" is "sufficiently broad to ensure that no serious question of applica-
tion arises in the vast range of cases. . .").
27. Barry, Toward Universalism, at 225 n.123.
7
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on account of impairments that "can be expected to result in death or [that
have] lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less
than 12 months." 28 The ADA, by contrast, is a civil rights law, not a bene-
fits law. It does not provide cash benefits to those who cannot work; it pro-
vides antidiscrimination protection to those who can.29 By its terms, the
ADA protects all those who face barriers - attitudinal, architectural, and so
on -because of their impairments.3 o
Importantly, the ADA's definition of disability is not new. It was taken
verbatim from an earlier federal law, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
which prohibits the federal government and recipients of federal funds
from discriminating based on disability.31 Although the U.S. Supreme
Court and lower courts had given the definition of disability an expansive
reading under the Rehabilitation Act, these broad interpretations did not
hold under the ADA. Instead, the Supreme Court and lower courts finely
parsed the definition of disability, narrowing the ADA's scope of coverage
to those with the most severely limiting impairments. 32 As discussed in
Part IV, these narrow interpretations spurred Congress to amend the ADA
in 2008, greatly expanding the ADA's scope of coverage and what it means
to be "disabled."
28. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (providing disability insurance benefit
payments to those with an "inability to engage in substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in
death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months.. .").
29. Barry, Congress Intended, supra note 25. As further discussed below, ADA protection ex-
tends beyond employment to public services such as education and transportation, as well as
to places of public accommodation like restaurants and hotels. See infra note 209 (discussing
examples of ADA's comprehensive coverage).
30. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5) (2005)
("[I]ndividuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of discrimination, includ-
ing outright intentional exclusion, the discriminatory effects of architectural, transportation,
and communication barriers, overprotective rules and policies, failure to make modifications
to existing facilities and practices, exclusionary qualification standards and criteria, segrega-
tion, and relegation to lesser services, programs, activities, benefits, jobs, or other opportunities
. . . ."). See also ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 2(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 Historical and Statu-
tory Notes ("[I]n enacting the ADA, Congress recognized that physical and mental disabilities
in no way diminish a person's right to fully participate in all aspects of society, but that people
with physical or mental disabilities are frequently precluded from doing so because of preju-
dice, antiquated attitudes, or the failure to remove societal and institutional barriers.").
31. Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006) (prohibiting discrimination in
federal programs based on disability); Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974 § 111(A), Pub.
L. No. 93-513, 88 Stat. 1617 (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.); 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)
(2006) (defining "individual with a disability"). Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act "is just
one part of a larger and complex statute that increased federal support for vocational and re-
habilitation programs." Barry, Congress Intended, supra note 25.
32. Barry, Congress Intended, supra note 25.
8 [Vol. 16
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III. GENDER IDENTITY DISORDER AND THE ADA OF 1990: ADA AS MORAL
CODE
Since 1990, the ADA has explicitly excluded from coverage the follow-
ing list of impairments:
(1) transvestism, transsexualism, pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism,
gender identity disorders not resulting from physical impairments, or
other sexual behavior disorders;
(2) compulsive gambling, kleptomania, or pyromania; or
(3) psychoactive substance use disorders resulting from current illegal
use of drugs.3 3
While subpart (1) purports to exclude all "sexual behavior disorders," it
notably includes Gender Identity Disorder (GID) (and Transsexualism,
which was folded into the definition of GID in 1994 and is no longer used
by the DSM) - which is not a sexual behavior disorder.34 Unlike the sexual
33. 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b) (2006).
34. The classification "Gender Identity Disorders," and the three diagnoses within that
classification, "Transsexualism," "Gender Identity Disorder of Childhood," and "Atypical
Gender Identity Disorder," first appeared in the DSM in 1980. AM. PSYCHIATRIc ASS'N,
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS: DSM-III 261-66 (1980). The
DSM-III, as it was called, considered "Gender Identity Disorders" to be a subclass of "Psycho-
sexual Disorders," alongside "Paraphilias" such as pedophilia and voyeurism. Id. at 261-66.
When the DSM was revised in 1987, the DSM-IH-R removed "Gender Identity Disorders" from
the subclass "Psychosexual Disorders" and instead listed it as a subclass of "Disorders Usually
First Evident in Infancy, Childhood, or Adolescence." AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC
AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS: DSM-III-R 27, 71 (1987) [hereinafter DSM-
Ill-R]. Paraphilias were listed as a subclass of "Sexual Disorders." Id. at 279. The DSM-lll-R
was the version of the DSM in effect at the time of the ADA's passage in 1990. This version
also added a fourth diagnosis, "Gender Identity Disorder of Adolescence or Adulthood, Non-
Transsexual Type," which differed from "Transsexualism" in that the former did not involve a
"persistent ... wish to get rid of one's primary and secondary sex characteristics and acquire
the sex characteristics of the other sex." Id. at 77.
In 1994, a new version of the DSM, the DSM-IV, "replaced the diagnosis of
'Transsexualism' with 'Gender Identity Disorder.'" See AM. PSYCHIATRIC AsS'N, DIAGNOSTIC
AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS: DSM-IV 532-38 (1994) [hereinafter DSM-
IV]. See also The Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association's Standards of Care for
Gender Identity Disorders, Sixth Version, TRANSGENDER LONDON,
http://transgenderlondon.com/
HBSOC.htm. Despite its removal from the DSM-IV, the word "transsexual" continues to be
used colloquially to refer to those "who seek to live in a gender different from the one assigned
at birth and who may seek or want medical intervention (through hormones and/or surgery)
for them to live comfortably in that gender." Teaching Transgender, NATIONAL CENTER FOR
TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, 16 (Jan. 2009), http://transequality.org/Resources/NCTE
TeachingTransgender.pdf. Like its predecessor, the DSM-IV distinguished between "Gender
Identity Disorders" and "Sexual Disorders." DSM-IV, supra note 34 at 493. The DSM-IV-TR
maintains this distinction, see AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
9
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disorders listed in subpart (1), all of which are characterized by "recurrent,
intense sexual urges, fantasies, or behaviors that involve unusual objects,
activities, or situations," GID is, as its name suggests, a gender identity dis-
order.35
According to the DSM-IV, GID is characterized by a "strong desire" to
be "the other gender" and "clinically significant distress or impairment in
social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning."3 6 Like so
many other mental impairments 37 under review by the American Psychiat-
OF MENTAL DISORDERS: DSM-IV-TR 535 (2000), as do proposed changes to the DSM that will
take effect in 2013, see Gender Dysphoria, DSM-5 Proposed Revision, supra note 10.
35. DSM-IV, supra note 34, at 493, 532. By adding the words "not resulting from physical
impairments" after "gender identity disorders," the ADA presumably covers those whose GID
is attributable to intersex conditions (formerly known as "Hermaphroditism" and increasingly
referred to by the medical community as "Disorders of Sex Development" (DSD)), which affect
the sexual and reproductive anatomy. See 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(1) (2006). For a good discus-
sion of intersex conditions, see Yamuna Menon, Note, The Intersex Community and the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1221, 1227-32 (2011), and Types of Intersex Conditions,
TRANSFAITHONLINE, http://www.transfaithonline.org/intersections/ intersex/types/. At
least one court has suggested that the GID exclusion may not, in fact, exclude GID to the extent
that GID "results 'from physical impairments' in an individual's genome." Doe v. Yunits, 25
Mass. L. Rptr. 278 n.6 (Super. Ct., 2001) ("In light of the remarkable growth in our understand-
ing of the role of genetics in producing what were previously thought to be psychological dis-
orders, this Court cannot eliminate the possibility that all or some gender identity disorders
result 'from physical impairments' in an individual's genome."); see also Jennifer L. Levi &
Bennett H. Klein, Pursuing Protection for Transgender Through Disability, in TRANSGENDER
RIGHTS 84 (2006) (stating that ADA's inclusion "of gender identity disorders resulting from
physical impairments offer some hope for protection as the physical etiology of gender identity
disorder is more thoroughly researched and understood . .") (emphasis added).
36. DSM-IV, supra note 34, at 537-38.
37. The terms "mental impairment" and "mental disorder" are not without ambiguity.
They are sometimes used to refer to conditions impacting one's cognitive development, such
as Intellectual Development Disorder (formerly known as "Mental Retardation"). See Intellec-
tual Development Disorder: Proposed Revision, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N DSM-5 DEV. Proposed
revisions are no longer available online, but are on file with the author. Please see dsm5.org for
the final version of the rule. They are also used to refer to conditions impacting one's emotions
or behavior, such as Major Depressive Disorder or Oppositional Defiant Disorder. See Major
Depressive Disorder, Recurrent: Proposed Revision, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N DSM-5 DEv. Proposed
revisions are no longer available online, but are on file with the author. See dsm5.org for the
final version of the rule; Oppositional Defiance Disorder: Proposed Revision, AM. PSYCHIATRIC
ASS'N DSM-5 DEv. Proposed revisions are no longer available online, but are on file with the
author. Please see dsm5.org for the final version of the rule. Here I use the terms "mental im-
pairment" and "mental disorder" interchangeably to refer to conditions that impact cognition
as well as emotions and behavior. This is consistent with the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion's proposed revision to the definition of "mental disorder" in the DSM-5 as well as the U.S.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's definition of "mental impairment" under the
ADA. Compare Mental Disorder, DSM-5 Proposed Revision ("A Mental Disorder is a health con-
dition characterized by significant dysfunction in an individual's cognitions, emotions, or be-
haviors that reflects a disturbance in the psychological, biological, or developmental processes
underlying mental functioning."), with Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Pro-
visions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (2011) (August 17, 2012)
("[M]ental impairment means ... [any mental or psychological disorder, such as an intellectual
disability (formerly termed 'mental retardation'), organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental ill-
ness, and specific learning disabilities.").
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ric Association, the diagnostic criteria for GID are in a state of flux. 38 Under
the proposed DSM-5, GID will be renamed "Gender Dysphoria," 39 Which is
less "stigmatizing" and "better reflects the core of the problem: an incon-
gruence between, on the one hand, what identity one experiences and/or
expresses and, on the other hand, how one is expected to live based on
one's assigned gender (usually at birth)."40 Rather than "presuppos[e] the
existence of acute or inherent distress" associated with GID, the DSM-5
modifies the requirement of "clinically significant distress or impairment"
to include "a significantly increased risk of suffering death, pain, disability,
or an important loss of freedom." 41 According to the DSM-5's Working
Group on Sexual and Gender Identity Disorders, not all people with GID
are distressed and, according to some studies, they "generally function psy-
chologically in the non-clinical range." 42 The Working Group further sug-
gests that it is "stigma" that causes distress, not GID, and that the desire "to
be rid of body parts that do not fit one's identity is, in the absence of data,"
not "inherent[ly] distress[ing]." 43 According to the proposed DSM-5, the
"desire to be rid of one's primary and/or secondary sex characteristics be-
cause of a marked incongruence with one's experienced/expressed gender"
may not only not be distressing - it may well be liberating.
Given the unlikely company in which GID (and Transsexualism) finds
itself, one might guess that this list was not the result of careful congres-
sional deliberation. And one would be right. This list was a slapdash col-
lection of mental impairments drawn from the DSM-III-R44 and grafted on-
to the ADA by amendment to ensure passage in the Senate.45 What follows
38. See Gender Dysphoria, DSM-5 Proposed Revision, supra note 10.
39. Id.
40. Gender Dysphoria, DSM-5 Rationale, supra note 10 (stating that DSM-5 Neurodevelop-
mental Disorders Working Group "received many favorable comments about the proposed
name change, particularly with regard to the removal of the 'Disorder' label from the name of
the diagnosis").
41. Compare Gender Dysphoria, DSM-5 Proposed Revision, supra note 10 with DSM-IV, supra
note 34, at 537-38 (emphasis added).
42. Gender Dysphoria, DSM-5 Rationale, supra note 10; see id. ("[Miany individuals, after
transition, do not meet any more the criteria set for gender dysphoria . . .
43. Id.
44. See DSM-III-R, supra note 34.
45. 135 CONG. REc. S10785 (Sep. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Armstrong) ("Under this act the
term 'disability' does not include 'homosexuality,' 'bisexuality,' 'transvestism,' 'pedophilia,'
'transsexualism,' 'exhibitionism,' 'voyeurism,' 'compulsive gambling,' 'kleptomania,' or 'py-
romania,' 'gender identity disorders,' current 'psychoactive substance use disorders,' as de-
fined by DSM-III-R which are not the result of medical treatment, or 'other sexual behavior
disorders.'"). Because the Senate also passed Senator Jesse Helms' amendment to the ADA
excluding "transvestites" from coverage, see 135 CONG. REC. S10,776 (daily ed. Sep. 7, 1989),
the ADA excludes "transvestism" twice. See id. at S10776; see also Colker, Homophobia, supra
note 9, at 50 (stating that this "redundancy is itself derogatory because it highlights the legisla-
tors' extreme desire to prevent this group from having legal protection."); Robert Burgdorf,
The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights
Statute, 26 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 519 (1991) ("No evidence suggests that Congress inves-
11I
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is a discussion of how that list came to be. Because much of this story has
not been told, I discuss it in some detail.46
A. Excluding Mental Impairments: The Senate Floor
To understand why GID was excluded from the ADA, it is first neces-
sary to understand legislators' objections to mental impairments more gen-
erally. As the ADA progressed through the Senate Committee on Labor
and Human Resources, no attempt was made to exclude particular impair-
ments, mental or physical.4 7 In fact, Congress deliberately went in the op-
posite direction, including all impairments so long as they actually limited,
previously limited, or were regarded as limiting a major life activity. 48 Ac-
cording to the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources Report:
It is not possible to include in the legislation a list of all the specific
conditions, diseases, or infections that would constitute physical or
mental impairments because of the difficulty of ensuring the com-
prehensiveness of such a list, particularly in light of the fact that
new disorders may develop in the future. The term includes, how-
ever, such conditions, diseases and infections as: mental retarda-
tion, emotional illness, specific learning disabilities, drug addiction,
and alcoholism. 49
Disability rights advocates, therefore, had no indication of efforts to ex-
clude impairments.50
This all changed during the Senate floor debate on the ADA on Septem-
ber 7, 1989. Late in the day, Senator William Armstrong (R-CO) came to the
floor and expressed his concerns with the ADA's definition of disability -
specifically, its coverage of certain mental impairments. 51 Several other
tigated such conditions, except, perhaps, for the problem of illegal drug use. Consequently, it
is arguable that the members of Congress relied upon nothing other than their own negative
reactions, fears and prejudices in fashioning the list of excluded classes.").
46. For two helpful articles discussing the legislative history of the GID exclusion, see
Colker, Homophobia, supra note 9, at 36-44, and Kari E. Hong, Categorical Exclusions: Exploring
Legal Responses to Health Care Discrimination Against Transsexuals, 11 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 88,
117-118 (2002).
47. Telephone Interview with Chai Feldblum, Professor of Law, Georgetown University
Law Center (Oct. 10, 2011) [hereinafter Feldblum Interview].
48. See S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 20 (1989) (defining disability to mean "(1) A physical or men-
tal impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individ-
ual; (2) A record of such impairment; or (3) Being regarded as having such an impairment").
49. Id.
50. Feldblum Interview, supra note 47. See also 135 CONG. REC. S10785 (daily ed. Sep. 7,
1989) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (noting that ADA's "sweeping" inclusion of all mental im-
pairments was "ignored" until Armstrong raised this issue during floor debate).
51. 135 CONG. REC. S10753 (daily ed. Sep. 7, 1989).
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senators shared his concerns, which were of three types: moral, legal, and
pragmatic.
1. The Moral Case for Excluding Certain Mental Impairments
Armstrong's first concern with the ADA's coverage of certain mental
impairments was a moral one. Armstrong "could not imagine the sponsors
would want to provide a protected legal status to somebody who has such
[mental] disorders, particularly those [that] might have a moral content to
them or which in the opinion of some people have a moral content." 52 Ac-
cording to Armstrong, although "the ideals of our country certainly call
upon the Senate to do whatever it can to be helpful to people in wheelchairs
or who have some kind of a physical disability or handicap of some sort and
who are trying to overcome it," the ADA extended coverage to "[m]ental
disorders, such as alcohol withdrawal, delirium, hallucinosis, dementia
with alcoholism, marijuana, delusional disorder, cocaine intoxication, co-
caine delirium, [and] disillusional disorder," which "by any ordinary defi-
nition we would not expect to be included."5 3
In a colloquy with Senator Harkin, Senator Armstrong expressed con-
cern with still more "mental disorders," namely, current drug and alcohol
abuse, "homosexuality and bisexuality . . . exhibitionism, pedophilia, vo-
yeurism . . compulsive kleptomania, or other impulse control disorders ...
conduct disorder, [and] any other disruptive behavior disorder. .. ."54 Sen-
ator Harkin responded that none would be covered except for conduct dis-
order or other disruptive behavior disorder to the extent it was "closely
connected with a mental disorder."5 5 Senator Armstrong stated that he
would submit a list of mental impairments to Senator Harkin for exclusion
from the ADA, and would offer an amendment if "there [was] any doubt"
as to their exclusion. 56
Senator Warren Rudman (R-NH) shared Armstrong's concerns, particu-
larly with regard to the coverage of alcoholism, drug addiction, compulsive
gambling, pedophilia, kleptomania, and other "socially unacceptable, often
illegal, behavior." According to Senator Rudman:
A diagnosis of certain types of mental illness is frequently made on
the basis of a pattern of socially unacceptable behavior and lacks
any physiological basis. In short, we are talking about behavior
that is immoral, improper, or illegal and which individuals are en-
gaging in of their own volition, admittedly for reasons we do not
52. Id. (statement of Sen. Armstrong).
53. Id.
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fully understand. Where we as a people have through a variety of
means, including our legal code, expressed disapproval of certain
conduct, I do not understand how Congress can create the possibil-
ity that employers are legally liable for taking such conduct into ac-
count when making employment-related decisions. In principle, I
agree with the concept that the mentally ill should be protected
from in[v]idious discrimination just as the physically handicapped
should be. However, people must bear some responsibility for the
consequences of their own actions.57
Echoing Senator Armstrong's and Rudman's moral concerns, Senator
Jesse Helms (R-NC) pressed the sponsors on the ADA's presumptive cov-
erage of five groups of individuals: "homosexuals"; "transvestites"; illegal
drug users and alcoholics; "people who are HIV positive or have active
AIDS disease"; and those with "psychosis, neurosis, or other mental, psy-
chological disease[s] or disorder[s]," namely, pedophilia, schizophrenia,
kleptomania, manic depression, intellectual disabilities, and psychotic dis-
orders.58 According to Senator Helms,
If this were a bill involving people in a wheelchair or those who
have been injured in the war, that is one thing. But how in the
world did you get to the place that you did not even [exiclude
transvestites? How did you get into this business of classifying
people who are HIV positive, most of whom are drug addicts or
homosexuals or bisexuals, as disabled? . . . What I get out of all of
this is here comes the U.S. Government telling the employer that he
cannot set up any moral standards for his business by asking
someone if he is HIV positive, even though 85 percent of those
people are engaged in activities that most Americans find abhor-
rent.... [H]e cannot say, look I feel very strongly about people who
engage in sexually deviant behavior or unlawful sexual practices.59
Senator Helms questioned whether, by covering these impairments, the
ADA deprived an employer of "the right to run his company as he sees fit,"
including "mak[ing] a judgment about [his] ... employees" based on his
"own moral standards." 60
Senator Harkin assured Senator Helms that, even absent an explicit ex-
clusion, homosexuality and bisexuality were not covered by the ADA - not
for moral reasons, but for medical ones. "[B]ehavior characteristics" such
57. Id. at S10796 (statement of Sen. Rudman).
58. Id. at S10765 (statement of Sen. Helms).
59. Id. at S10768, S10772.
60. Id. at S10765.
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as "homosexuality and bisexuality are not disabilities under any medical
standards." 61 Senator Harkin immediately accepted, without any debate,
Senator Helms' amendment excluding "transvestites," citing Helms' identi-
cal amendment excluding transvestites from the Fair Housing Act the pre-
vious year. 62 Senator Harkin also reluctantly agreed to Helms' conforming
amendment excluding from the Rehabilitation Act those currently using il-
legal drugs.63 By contrast, Senators Harkin and Kennedy strongly defended
the ADA's coverage of HIV/AIDS, noting that such coverage was "com-
pletely consistent with public health policy."6" "If we fail to provide this
protection," Senator Kennedy warned, "we will continue to drive this epi-
demic underground." 65 As a result, no amendment was offered to exclude
HIV/ AIDS during the Senate floor debate. 66
61. Id. at S10786 (statement of Sen. Harkin); see also supra note 26 and accompanying text.
The decision to exclude homosexuality and bisexuality from the ADA was consistent with the
treatment of sexual orientation under the Rehabilitation Act. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-596, at 88
(1990) (Conf. Rep.) ("The Senate bill restates current policy under section 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973 that the term 'disability' does not include homosexuality and bisexuality.").
62. 135 CONG. REC. at S10765; see also Colker, Homophobia supra note 9, at 39 (discussing
Senate floor debate on Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 and overwhelming support for
Helms' amendment, which passed by vote of 89-2). Interestingly, Senator Helms did not ex-
press similar opposition to the protection of Transsexualism and GID, both of which were clas-
sified as mental disorders in the DSM at the time of passage of the Fair Housing Amendments
Act (FHAA) and the ADA. See supra note 34. Helms' amendment to the FHAA, like his
amendment to the ADA one year later, excluded only "transvestites." 135 CoNG. REC. at
S10765.
Senator Helms also expressed opposition to protection for "transvestites" during the floor
debate over whether to override President Ronald Reagan's veto of the Civil Rights Restora-
tion Act of 1987. 134 CONG. REC. S4236 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 1988) (statement of Sen. Helms) (ob-
jecting to courts' interpretation of Rehabilitation Act's definition of disability to include
"transvestism and other compulsions or addi[c]tions, which churches or religious schools
might once have felt comfortable in regarding as moral problems, not mental handicaps"); id.
("When people ... think of handicaps, what first comes to mind are diseases which have no
conceivable moral content and yet have been associated in the past with irrational fears - such
as epilepsy -or else physical impairments. ... But now we propose ... to open for the courts
the opportunity to eliminate the entire concept of a moral qualification for any job, position, or
privilege . . . by referring to the strong trend in psychiatry to classify almost all compulsive or
destructive behavior patterns as discrete and medically treatable diseases.").
63. 135 CONG. REC. at S10765 ("[Tihe war on drugs will be lost if those who abuse drugs
are allowed to hide behind laws designed to help those who are seriously handicapped," such
as "the mentally retarded, the deaf, the blind, and those with muscular dystrophy.") (state-
ment of Sen. Helms); see id. (statement of Sen. Harkin) ("I must say to the Senator I would have
preferred not to amend any other statute [i.e., the Rehabilitation Act] during the consideration
of [the ADA]; a position, which I might add, with which the administration concurs.").
64. Id. at S10768 (statement of Sen. Kennedy); id. at S10772 (statement of Sen. Harkin).
65. Id. at S10768 (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
66. During the floor debate in the House, coverage of HIV/AIDS was again in controver-
sy-this time for health reasons, not moral ones. "Some representatives claimed that the bill
would bankrupt the restaurant industry by forcing employers to hire individuals who are
HIV-positive, which would cause the public to perceive that their food was unsafe." Colker,
Homophobia, supra note 9, at 46. Representative Jim Chapman (D-TX) offered an amendment
allowing a food service employer to deny employment to a person "with an infectious or
communicable disease of public health significance," which would have included people with
15
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In response to Senator Helms' opposition to the inclusion of various
mental impairments, Senator Harkin explained that "some people only
think of people who are physically disabled as being handicapped. People
can be mentally handicapped as well." 67 He elaborated:
There is a wellspring of fears and unfounded prejudices about peo-
ple with disabilities, unfounded fears, whether people have mental
disorders, whether they are manic depressives or schizophrenia or
paranoia, or unfounded fears and prejudices based upon physical
disabilities. The point of the [ADA] is to start breaking down those
barriers of fear and prejudice and unfounded fears, to get past that
point so that people begin to look at people based on their abilities,
not first looking at their disability. 68
For example, Senator Harkin added, manic depression might be "com-
pletely controlled [by] ... prescription drugs." 69
Senator Pete Domenici (R-NM) likewise defended the ADA's inclusion
of mental impairments, explaining that other types of discrimination "just
scratch the surface in terms of the suffering that goes on in the lives of peo-
ple who are assumed to be disabled because of . .. serious mental illness." 70
Noting that Winston Churchill and Abraham Lincoln were almost certainly
"manic-depressive," and that "hundreds of thousands of Americans today.
. have been diagnosed or are being treated for manic-depression, bipolar
effective disease or schizophrenia," Senator Domenici stated that "the time
has arrived in the United States when people who have mental illnesses ...
[should] not be automatically discriminated against for employment in this
country."7l
HIV/AIDS. 136 CONG. REC. H2478 (daily ed. May 17,1990) (statement of Rep. Chapman). The
House approved the Chapman amendment. Id. at H2483-84. When the bill went to confer-
ence, the Chapman amendment was removed, despite its support among senators, including
Helms and Armstrong. 136 CONG. REC. S9535, S9544 (daily ed. July 11, 1990) (statement of
Sen. Helms). When the Conference Report returned to the Senate for consideration, Senator
Hatch proposed a toothless (for people with HIV) version of the Chapman amendment, which
allowed an employer to deny employment to a person with an infectious or communicable
disease only if the disease is one that is "transmitted to others through the handling of food" as
determined by the Secretary of Health and Human Services. 136 CONG. REC. 9532 (1990); see
Colker, Honophobia, supra note 9, at 48. Hatch's amendment passed the Senate, was adopted at
the second Conference, and became law. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(e) (2006); see Colker, Homtophobia,
supra note 9, at 48-49.
67. 135 CONG. REc. S10768 (daily ed. Sep. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Harkin).
68. Id.
69. Id. at S10766.
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2. The Legal Case for Excluding Mental Impairments
Senator Armstrong's second concern with covering mental impairments
was a legal one. According to Armstrong, civil rights laws traditionally
deal "with very clear-cut, readily discernible categories," like "race, reli-
gion, and sex.... A person is or is not a man or a woman. A person is or is
not a Catholic, a Jew, a Mormon, whatever, a Baptist, a Presbyterian. That
is something we can readily determine. A person either is or is not Irish,
Italian, and so on." 72 Rather than "list[ing] the specific protected catego-
ries," Armstrong explained, the ADA "proceeds from an entirely different
point of view" by including "a very broad vague definition" of disability
that extends civil rights protection "in a very broad and [] unquantified
way."73 Specifically, the ADA "protects all mental impairments that sub-
stantially limit a major life activity," which, according to Armstrong, meant
that voyeurism, pedophilia, compulsive gambling and the "vast numbers of
mental disorders" contained in that "great, fat book called the [DSM-III-R]"
were "in" the ADA unless Congress took them out.74
Noting that the ADA's coverage of mental impairments was "appealing
to the heart" but ought to "give our heads some concern," Armstrong add-
ed that he planned to introduce an amendment "that will take voyeurism
and some other things out."75
Significantly, no one challenged Armstrong's characterization of civil
rights laws. No one pointed out that civil rights laws protect all races, in-
cluding white people; all religions, including atheists; and all sexes, includ-
ing men.76 No one argued that the ADA's applicability to mental impair-
ments was therefore consistent with traditional civil rights law, not at odds
with it. Furthermore, no one took issue with Armstrong's assumption that
having (or having a history of, or being regarded as having) a mental im-
pairment, by itself, meant that one was covered under the statute. In order
to be considered "disabled," and therefore covered, the ADA requires more
than just a mental impairment. It requires that the mental impairment sub-
stantially limit a major life activity (under prongs 1 and 2) or that a person
be regarded as having a substantially limiting impairment (prong 3).77
72. 135 CONG. REC. S10772 (daily ed. Sep. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Armstrong).
73. Id.
74. 135 CONG. REC. S11174, S11176 (daily ed. Sep. 14, 1989) (statement of Sen. Armstrong).
75. 135 CONG. REC. S10772-73 (daily ed. Sep. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Armstrong).
76. See e.g., McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 278-79 (1976) ("Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits the discharge of 'any individual' because of 'such in-
dividual's race' . . . . Its terms are not limited to discrimination against members of any par-
ticular race.") (internal citations omitted).
77. See S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 20 (1989) (defining disability as "a physical or mental im-
pairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual, a
record of such an impairment, or being regarded as having such an impairment"); accord.
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 3(2), 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2005).
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3. The Pragmatic Case for Excluding Mental Impairments
Armstrong's third concern with the ADA's coverage of mental impair-
ments was a pragmatic one. Given the vast and ever-changing array of
mental impairments, Armstrong warned of the ADA's invitation to a flood
of litigation.78 In a statement published seven days after passage of the
ADA, Armstrong stated that the ADA's protection of "all mental impair-
ments that substantially limit a major life activity will have the most far-
reaching and potentially disruptive effects on private decisionmakers....
[T]he private sector will be swamped with mental disability litigation." 79
According to Armstrong, private employers had better "prepare
[them]selves for lawsuits based on the following types of mental condi-
tions": compulsive gambling,80 acrophobia (fear of heights) and other pho-
bias; depressive neurosis8 1 ; paranoid schizophrenia; manic depression; bor-
derline personality disorder; "sexual disorders: transvestism and
transexualism"; schizoid personality disorder; stress disorders; and a catch-
all "miscellaneous mental disorders." 82
For each, Armstrong cited one or more cases in which courts found peo-
ple alleging discrimination based on those mental impairments to be cov-
ered under the Rehabilitation Act. "In the reported cases," Senator Arm-
strong noted,
persons with mental impairments often lose their cases because
they are found not to be "otherwise qualified" for the position or
78. See 135 CONG. REC. S11174-75 (daily ed. Sep. 14, 1989) (statement of Sen. Armstrong).
Senators Helms, Rudman, and Humphrey made similar arguments. See 135 CONG. REC.
S10755 (daily ed. Sep. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Helms) (stating that ADA would lead to the
"persecution of some small businessman" by "a horde of bureaucrats"); id. at S10783 (stating
that ADA's coverage of "drug addicts and alcoholics ... schizophrenics, manic depressives,
and persons with extremely low IQ's[,] ... persons with deadly infectious diseases, like AIDS.
. . [and people with] virtually any mental or physical shortcoming ... will deter employers
from preserving high standards of fitness, safety, and efficiency within their work force")
(statement of Sen. Humphrey); id. at S10796 (statement of Sen. Rudman) (stating that "[a]s a
matter of law, this country has always granted employers a wide degree of latitude in making
employment-related decisions, including the right to make judgments based on non-work re-
lated behavior. To limit this right based on the diagnosis of a mental illness or chemical de-
pendency may be opening up a Pandora's box.").
79. 135 CONG. REC. S11174, S11176 (daily ed. Sep. 14, 1989) (statement of Sen. Armstrong).
80. Compulsive gambling, of course, had already been excluded by Armstrong's amend-
ment no. 722. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing passage of amendment ex-
cluding "compulsive gambling" from definition of disability under ADA). Armstrong may
have included compulsive gambling in his subsequent statement out of concern that the House
would not incorporate a similar exclusion.
81. "Depressive Neurosis," defined in DSM-II as "an excessive reaction of depression due
to an internal conflict or to an identifiable event such as the loss of a love object or cherished
possession" was replaced by "Dysthymic Disorder" in DSM-III. See W. EDWARD CRAIGHEAD
Er AL., PSYCHOPATHOLOGY: HISTORY, DIAGNOSIS, AND EMPIRICAL FOUNDATIONS 332 (2008).
82. 135 CONG. REC. S11175-76 (daily ed. Sep. 14, 1989) (statement of Sen. Armstrong).
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benefit they seek. On the other hand, sometimes they win. In ei-
ther case, S. 933 gives persons with mental impairments a statutory
basis for a lawsuit whenever a private employer or private provider
of public accommodations takes an action that the impaired per-
son[] believes is to his or her detriment and based on his or her dis-
ability.83
Implicit in Armstrong's case summaries is the belief that discrimination
claims brought by people with mental impairments are inherently frivo-
lous, and that such plaintiffs should never win. It is not "discrimination"
when an employer fires or refuses to hire or accommodate a person with a
mental impairment, Armstrong seems to argue - it is good business. Better,
then, to dispose of such "egregious lawsuits" at the outset, rather than have
to defend them through "litigation which is costly and time consuming."84
Because Armstrong submitted his case summaries into the record sever-
al days after the Senate passed the Americans with Disabilities Act, no
senator ever challenged his interpretation of the cases. Had the ADA's
sponsors had the opportunity to parse those cases, a different story might
have unfolded -a story about cases that were not frivolous but tragic, and
nothing to suggest a flood of litigation.85
For example, under the heading "Sexual Disorders," Senator Armstrong
objected to the holdings of two cases that acknowledged that
"transexualism" and "transvestism," respectively, were covered "disabili-
ties"' under the Rehabilitation Act.86 In Doe v. United States Postal Service,
the plaintiff, a male-to-female transsexual, had her conditional job offer re-
voked after she disclosed her intent to transition to the other sex and sug-
gested that she be allowed to work as a woman rather than changing her
physical appearance during her employment.87 Describing the case as a
"sad" one, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia de-
nied the United States Postal Service's motion to dismiss and held that the
plaintiff stated a claim for "disability" discrimination.88
In Blackwell v. U.S. Department of the Treasury, a Treasury Department
supervisor canceled a job vacancy just hours after interviewing the plaintiff,
a "transvestite" male who dressed in feminine clothing.89 Notwithstanding
the plaintiff's priority hiring credentials (the plaintiff had worked for nearly
ten years in other branches of the Treasury Department, and had been laid
83. Id. at S11174.
84. Id. at S11176.
85. See Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471, 511 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[I]t is hard to
believe that providing individuals with one more antidiscrimination protection will make any
more of them file baseless or vexatious lawsuits.").
86. 135 CONG. REC. S11174-75 (daily ed. Sep. 14, 1989) (statement of Sen. Armstrong).
87. No. 84-3296, 1985 WL 9446 at *1 (D.D.C. June 12, 1985).
88. Id. at *1, *3.
89. 656 F. Supp. 713, 714 (D.D.C. 1986).
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off due to a reduction in force), and over the recommendation of an experi-
enced, competent interviewer that the plaintiff be hired, the Department
supervisor "changed the rules to avoid the inevitable administrative hassle
that would occur if he declined a qualified applicant . . . . [The supervisor]
knew [the] plaintiff could do the job and had no sound basis for even refus-
ing to accept him for the job."90 Characterizing the Treasury Department's
actions as "highly reprehensible," the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia nevertheless held that, while transvestism was a cov-
ered disability under the Rehabilitation Act, the plaintiff was not entitled to
relief because he had not shown that he was refused hire on that basis. 91
According to the court, the plaintiff was instead refused hire "because [the
supervisor] believed he was a homosexual (a condition not protected under
the Rehabilitation Act)." 92 Significantly, the court acknowledged what it
called the "underlying injustice" of its decision, and called on "wiser
heads" to "correct" it.9
While indicating that neither "transexualism" nor "transvestism" should
be a covered "disability," Armstrong never gave a reason for his objection.
He never explained why it was right for the employers in Doe and Blackwell
to refuse to hire the plaintiffs based on transsexualism or transvestism, de-
spite the fact that both plaintiffs were eminently qualified to perform their
jobs (i.e., the plaintiff in Doe had received and accepted her job offer, and
the plaintiff in Blackwell was recommended for hire).94 Rather than "sad"
and "reprehensible," or an "injustice" to be corrected, Armstrong suggested
that the actions of the employers in both cases were beyond repute. 95
Another of Armstrong's case summaries dealt with compulsive gam-
bling.96 In Rezza v. U.S. Department of Justice, an FBI agent was fired for
gambling away $2,000 in government funds in Atlantic City, and he sued
his employer under the Rehabilitation Act for discriminating against him
based on his compulsive gambling.97 The U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania indicated that compulsive gambling could be a
covered disability and denied the FBI's motion for summary judgment
based on material facts at issue regarding whether the agent was qualified
to perform the job.98
Notwithstanding compulsive gambling's firm place under the DSM-III-
R, Senator Armstrong attacked the premise that compulsive gambling was




94. See Doe, 1985 WL 9446 at *1; Blackwell, 656 F. Supp. at 714.
95. Doe, 1985 WL 9446, at *1; Blackwell, 656 F. Supp. at 715; 135 CONG. REc. S11175 (daily ed.
Sep. 14, 1989) (statement of Sen. Armstrong).
96. 135 CONG. REC. S11175 (daily ed. Sep. 14, 1989) (statement of Sen. Armstrong).
97. No. 87-6732, 1988 WL 48541, at *1 (E.D. Pa. May 16, 1988).
98. Id. at *1, *6.
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an impairment at all and implied that, even if it were, such an impairment
rendered a person per se unqualified. 9 What Armstrong did not say was
that the agent was a twenty-two-year veteran of the FBI with an "otherwise
fine record of FBI and prior military service" and that, immediately follow-
ing the incident, the agent entered a 22-day treatment program.100 When
the agent returned to active duty, he performed his duties satisfactorily, at-
tended Gamblers Anonymous twice a week, and no longer gambled. 101
Senator Armstrong also failed to note that the FBI's Philadelphia director
recommended against the agent's dismissal.102
In light of these facts, it seems far less clear whether the agent's gam-
bling history necessarily disqualified him from serving in the FBI. Contrary
to Armstrong's critique, the court's decision to defer judgment pending re-
ceipt of more facts regarding the agent's qualifications seems entirely rea-
sonable. Armstrong's proposed denial of coverage of all claims involving
compulsive gambling, by contrast, seems too crude a tool to root out merit-
less claims - a knee-jerk response that would eliminate many legitimate
claims (especially considering the other tools provided by the ADA, includ-
ing the qualification requirement and direct threat defense). 103
The remaining cases cited by Armstrong provide even less support for
his proposed blanket exclusion of various mental impairments. In each
case, the plaintiff was found "disabled" under the Rehabilitation Act but
"not qualified" to perform the job. 104 Far from proving abuse of the law,
these cases demonstrate the Rehabilitation Act's balanced approach: to
99. See 135 CONG. REC. S11175 (daily ed. Sep. 14, 1989) (statement of Sen. Armstrong) (re-
jecting reasoning of case in which court refused to grant summary judgment to federal gov-
ernment under Rehabilitation Act, in part, because issue of fact remained as to whether com-
pulsive gambler was "otherwise qualified" to be FBI agent) (citing Rezza).
100. Rezza, 1988 WL 4851 at *1 n.2
101. Id. at *1
102. Id.
103. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336 §103 (1990). Several
other cases cited by Armstrong likewise support the legitimacy of discrimination claims in-
volving various mental impairments and the importance of reaching the merits in these cases.
See, e.g., Majors v. Hous. Auth. of DeKalb Ga., 652 F.2d 454, 458 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that
material facts were at issue regarding whether tenant with mental impairment requiring com-
panionship of dog was disabled, whether she was otherwise qualified to live in housing com-
plex that prohibited dogs, and whether housing authority failed to reasonably accommodate
her); Balzac v. Columbia Univ. Press, 495 N.Y.S.2d 45, 45 (App. Div. 1985) (holding that mate-
rial facts were at issue regarding whether sales representative with manic depression, who
was terminated on same day he returned from treatment and hospitalization, was qualified to
perform his job); Barnes v. Barbosa, 494 N.E.2d 619, 623 (I. App. Ct. 1986) (holding that, un-
der Illinois's Human Rights Act, bus driver with phobic reaction to carbon monoxide was dis-
abled, and remanding case for determination of whether bus company discriminated against
driver by not allowing him to transfer to another position within the company). But see Forrisi
v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 935 (4th Cir. 1986) (declining to reach merits and holding that utility
worker with acrophobia, or fear of heights, who was terminated because he could not climb
ladders to certain heights was not disabled).
104. See 135 CONG. REC. S11175-76 (daily ed. Sep. 14, 1989) (statement of Sen. Armstrong).
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make out a successful claim of disability discrimination, one must show not
only that one is "disabled," but also that one is qualified to perform the job,
which is no easy feat. For example, in Doe v. Region 13 Mental Health-Mental
Retardation Commission, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a dis-
trict court judgment upholding a mental health center's decision to termi-
nate a staff psychologist with depressive-neurosis who threatened to com-
mit suicide.105 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals easily concluded that the
staff member had a "disability" under the Rehabilitation Act, but held that
she was not "otherwise qualified" to perform her job.106 Notwithstanding
the staff member's consistently "outstanding" job reviews, the court credit-
ed her treating physician's testimony that she was "severely depressed and
suicidal" and therefore a threat to herself and her patients.107
Similarly, in Doe v. New York University, the Second Circuit reversed a
district court injunction ordering NYU Medical School to admit a medical
student with bipolar disorder because of a history of self-destructive and
anti-social behavior.108 In that case, the court concluded that the student
had a disability but suggested that she was not "otherwise qualified" for
admission to the school.109 Despite supporting affidavits from several treat-
ing psychiatrists and the non-recurrence of symptoms in recent years while
the plaintiff earned a masters degree from Harvard and worked for the fed-
eral government, the court found evidence that there was a "significant risk
that [she would] have a recurrence of her mental disorder, with resulting
danger to herself and to others with whom she would be associated as a
medical student."1 10
105. Doe v. Region 13 Mental Health-Mental Retardation Com'n, 705 F.2d 1402, 1404-05
(5th Cir. 1983).
106. Id. at 1408, 1412.
107. Id. at 1409.
108. Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 772 (2d Cir. 1981).
109. Id. at 779.
110. Id. at 777; see also Fields v. Lyng, 705 F. Supp. 1134, 1137 (D. Md. 1988) (assuming, ar-
guendo, that labor negotiator with behavioral disorder that resulted in "anxiety over travel
and a propensity to shoplift, or kleptomania" was disabled, and holding that employee was
not qualified because "he cannot travel safely or be trusted as a negotiator" and that, in any
event, his employer reasonably accommodated him); Franklin v. U.S. Postal Service, 687 F.
Supp. 1214, 1218 (S.D. Ohio 1988) (holding that postal worker with paranoid schizophrenia
was disabled but not qualified because she refused to take medication, had excessive unex-
cused absences, and lashed out at co-workers and members of the public, and that, in any
event, her employer reasonably accommodated her); Matzo v. Postmaster General, 685 F.
Supp. 260, 263 (D.D.C. 1987) (holding that legal secretary with manic depression was disabled
but not qualified due to excessive absences, irregular attendance, and insubordination; and
holding that, in any event, her employer reasonably accommodated her); Swann v. Walters,
620 F. Supp. 741, 747 (D.D.C. 1984) (holding that computer operator with paranoid schizo-
phrenia, whose job required security clearance and involved access to highly sensitive medical
records, was disabled but not qualified because of his conviction for child sex abuse); Boyd v.
U.S. Postal Service, No. 82-126R, 1983 WL 636, at *1, *8 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 1, 1983) (holding that
postal worker with post-traumatic stress disorder was disabled but not qualified due to poor
work history; and holding that, in any event, his employer reasonably accommodated him);
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Rather than allow courts to engage in the careful consideration of quali-
fications demanded by these cases, Armstrong suggested that these cases
ought to be foreclosed altogether by denying anyone with a mental im-
pairment a cause of action." "Who is a judge to believe?" Armstrong
asked rhetorically.112 His answer: the employer -every time.
Significantly, Armstrong offered no support for his argument that cov-
erage of various mental impairments would necessarily lead to a deluge of
claims.113 The cases cited by Armstrong indicate no flood of litigation un-
der the Rehabilitation Act with respect to such impairments and, even if
they did, Congress has never seen the potential for lawsuits "as reason to
restrict classes of antidiscrimination coverage."114 Furthermore, if litigation
were Armstrong's primary concern, EEOC charge statistics indicate that
Armstrong should have targeted orthopedic impairments, not (or not only)
mental ones.115
B. Excluding GID: The Untold Story of the Senate Antechamber
Behind the scenes and very late in the day, Senator Armstrong circulat-
ed his proposed amendment-a "long list of various kinds of conduct ...
extracted from the DSM III[-R]" - to the bill's sponsors, Senators Harkin,
Kennedy, Dole, and Hatch.116 According to Professor Chai Feldblum, one
of the lead advocates for the disability rights community, Senator Arm-
strong's list consisted of "four pages of mental impairments literally copied
from the pages of the DSM-III-R."u 7 Disability rights advocates recom-
Schmidt v. Bell, No. 82-1758, 1983 WL 631, at *10-*13 (E.D. Pa. Sep. 9, 1983) (holding that stu-
dent loan collector with post-traumatic stress disorder was disabled but not qualified because
of his behavioral and attitudinal problems and failure to adhere to routine office policy and
procedure); Guerriero v. Schultz, 557 F. Supp. 511, 513 (D.D.C. 1983) (holding that foreign ser-
vice officer with schizoid personality disorder and history of alcoholism was disabled but not
qualified because, among other things, he could not travel on account of his need for continu-
ing therapy in U.S.); Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 935 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding that utility
worker with acrophobia, or fear of heights, who was terminated because he could not climb
ladders to certain heights was not disabled (under "regarded as" prong) because he could per-
form other jobs).
111. See 135 CONG. REC. S11175-76 (Sep. 14, 1989) (statement of Sen. Armstrong).
112. Id.
113. See id. at S11174.
114. Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471, 511 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
115. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COM'N, OFFICE OF RESEARCH, INFORMATION, AND
PLANNING, ADA CHARGE DATA BY IMPAIRMENT/BASES - RECEIPTS FY 1997-FY 2011,
http://eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/ada-receipts.cfm (last visited June 4, 2012).
116. 135 CONG. REC. S10772 (daily ed. Sep. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
117. Feldblum Interview, supra note 47. As Legislative Counsel with the American Civil
Liberties Union in Washington D.C. and Staff Attorney with the ACLU AIDS Project, Professor
Feldblum was "the lead legal counsel for the disability and civil rights communities in Wash-
ington. D.C. during the three-year negotiations on the Americans with Disabilities Act." Chai
R. Feldblum, Medical Examinations and Inquiries Under the Americans with Disabilities Act: A View
from the Inside, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 521, 521 n.* (1991).
23
23
Barry: Disabilityqueer: Federal Disability Rights Protection for Transgender People
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2013
YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J.
mended to the bill's sponsors that Senator Armstrong's proposed amend-
ment "be put to an up or down vote," which they predicted would fail
handedly."18
The sponsors' staff responded that they "wanted to negotiate the
amendment with Senator Armstrong."119 When disability rights advocates
explained that the proposed amendment was "nothing more than a laun-
dry-list of mental impairments and that there was nothing to negotiate," the
sponsors reiterated that a "negotiation was the only option" at that point.
Further, it was made clear that "homosexuality and bisexuality needed to
be in the negotiated list of exclusions."120
Disability rights advocates whittled down Senator Armstrong's four-
page list of exclusions to approximately five conditions.121 As required by
the bill's sponsors, homosexuality and bisexuality were among the exclud-
ed conditions.122 Disability rights advocates saw "little downside to exclud-
ing those, since neither homosexuality nor bisexuality was considered a
mental impairment under the DSM-III-R (and, therefore, was not a disabil-
ity to begin with)."123 Consistent with Harkin's response to Armstrong's
questions during the floor debate, "kleptomania was also included in the
initial list of proposed exclusions; GID was not."124
After receiving the revised list of exclusions, Senator Hatch entered the
Senate antechamber and told Feldblum and other disability rights advo-
cates that he "needed some more."125 Feeling "sick to her stomach,"
Feldblum recalls, GID and approximately six other conditions found their
way onto the list-and out of the ADA.1 26 The final list hued closely to the
floor debate: all impairments except GID and pyromania were explicitly
mentioned by Senator Armstrong either on the Senate floor or in his state-
ment published one week later.127
Well after 10 p.m. that evening, Senator Armstrong came to the floor
and introduced the negotiated list as Amendment No. 722, which ad-
dressed his "most obvious concems."128 Senator Harkin stated that the
118. Feldblum Interview, supra note 47.
119. Id. Cf 135 CONG. REC. S10785 (daily ed. Sep. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (com-
plimenting Senator Armstrong for "work[ing] long and hard this evening with the majority
floor managers and the minority floor manager" on "a very good amendment" excluding GID
and several other mental impairments, and committing to keeping amendment in final version
of bill).
120. Feldblum Interview, supra note 47.
121. Id.
122. See supra notes 54-55, 58-61 and accompanying text.
123. Feldblum Interview, supra note 47.
124. Id.; see also 135. CONG. REC. S10785 (daily ed. Sep. 7, 1989).
125. Feldblum Interview, supra note 47.
126. Id.
127. 135 CONG. REC. S11175-76 (daily ed. Sep. 14, 1989) (statement of Sen. Armstrong); id. at
S10754 (daily ed. Sep. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Armstrong).
128. 135 CONG. REC. S10785 (Sep. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Armstrong). See also id. at
S10781 ("It is quarter of 10 at night.") (statement of Sen. Ford).
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amendment, while "narrowly focused," was something he neither wanted
nor thought necessary, especially because many people with now-excluded
mental impairments would not have been able to show that they "were
qualified for various employment positions." 129 Senator Kennedy likewise
stated that the amendment was "certainly not one that I would have want-
ed in the legislation," but it was one "which we can live with."130 Senator
Hatch concluded that the country would "owe [Armstrong] a debt of grati-
tude when this bill is implemented."131
After passing the Senate by a vote of 76-8, the ADA was debated in the
House. In the House version of the bill, disability rights advocates changed
the list of excluded mental impairments slightly by subdividing the list into
"Homosexuality and Bisexuality" (non-impairments) and "Certain Condi-
tions" (impairments listed in the DSM-III-R), and deleting "psychoactive
substance-induced organic mental disorders." 132 This is the language that
was accepted in conference and passed into law.133
C. The ADA as Moral Code
Senator Armstrong wanted to exclude from the ADA nearly all mental
impairments, but his legal and pragmatic reasons for doing so do not with-
stand scrutiny. Antidiscrimination protection for people with mental im-
pairments is not uniquely at odds with civil rights law (the legal concern),
nor would such protection necessarily lead to a flood of frivolous litigation
(the pragmatic concern). 134 Armstrong's moral argument against antidis-
crimination protection for people with mental impairments is the only one
with any traction. It comes as no surprise, then, that all ten of the mental
impairments actually excluded from the ADA have, in Senator Armstrong's
words, "a moral content to them." 135 With the passage of Armstrong's
amendment, the ADA became, in effect, a moral code: "disability" cover-
age applies to those we pity, not those we despise.136
129. Id. at S10786 (statement of Sen. Harkin).
130. Id. at S10785 (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
131. See id. at S10785 (statement of Sen. Hatch).
132. H.R. REP. No. 101-596, at 88 (1990) (Conf. Rep.).
133. 42 U.S.C. § 12211 (2006). When Congress amended the Rehabilitation Act two years
later, it "add[ed] the exclusion set forth in the Americans with Disabilities Act for certain
groups." H.R. REP. No. 102-973, at 158 (1992) (Conf. Rep.).
134. See supra Section III.A.3.
135. 135 CONG. REC. S10753 (daily ed. Sep. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Armstrong).
136. See 42 U.S.C § 12211 (2006) (excluding transsexualism and GID). Senator Alan
Cranston's (D-CA) opposition to Senator Helms' amendment excluding transvestites from the
Fair Housing Amendments Act proved prescient: "[This amendment forsakes the basic prin-
ciples of fair play, reason, and justice. If we were to start excluding one category of individu-
als from coverage, we would be threatening to undermine the very essence of antidiscrimina-
tion laws... This amendment could open the door to any number ofattempts to exclude other disabilities
from this and other antidiscrimination laws.... [T~he whole purpose of the Fair Housing Act and
25
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Professor Feldblum offers a useful framework for analyzing the various
moral views that one may hold about gay people and gay sex, but this
framework is equally relevant to those who are transgender.137
One possible view . .. is that [being transgender] is morally harm-
ful (and/or sinful) to the individual and to the community. There-
fore, it must be discouraged to the greatest extent possible in order
to advance the moral health of these individuals and of the com-
munities in which they reside. The second view is that. . . [being
transgender] is not good, but it is not inherently harmful; it is more
akin to an unfortunate, abnormal health condition that one does not
wish for oneself . . ., but it is not a harmful element that must be ac-
tively purged from society. The third view is that . . . [being
transgender] has the same moral valence as [not being transgender]
and [transgender] people are basically similar to [non-transgender]
people.138
In 1989, GID was despised or, at best, misunderstood, by most.139 Sena-
tors Armstrong and Helms, consistent with the first view, believed that GID
was morally harmful, "abhorrent," and "deviant."140 For them, GID was to
be discouraged, not protected under the law.'4' Senators Harkin and Ken-
nedy took the second view, believing that GID was unfortunate and ab-
normal much like other impairments, but not harmful to others.142 Im-
portantly, no one subscribed to the third view-that GID, or being
transgender more generally, was "good."
In the end, GID was excluded from the ADA because several senators
other antidiscrimination laws is to provide across-the-board evenhanded protection, not to pick
and choose disabilities we approve of and exclude the ones we don't. If we remove protections from
one form of disability, who will be next?" 134 CONG. REC. S19726 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1988)
(statement of Sen. Cranston) (emphasis added); see also supra note 62 (only Senators Cranston
and Weicker voted against Helms' Fair Housing Act amendment).
137. See Chai R. Feldblum, Moral Conflict and Liberty: Gay Rights and Religion, 72 BROOK. L.
REV. 61, 69-70 (2006) [hereinafter Feldbum, Moral Conflict]; see also Chai R. Feldblum, Gay is
Good: The Moral Case for Marriage Equality and More, 17 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 139, 140-41 & n.4
(2005) [hereinafter Feldblum, Gay is Good] (stating that moral argumentation in support of true
equality for gay people "would be relevant to achieving true equality for transgender people
as well").
138. Feldblum, Moral Conflict, supra note 137, at 69-70.
139. See e.g., Shannon Price Minter, Do Transsexuals Dream of Gay Rights? Getting Real About
Transgender Inclusion, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS supra note 2 at 146-50 (describing emergence of
self-identified transgender rights movement as recent phenomenon, and noting historical mis-
understanding of transgender people among lesbians and gay men); Colker, Homophobia, supra
note 9, at 39 (discussing overwhelming support for Helms amendment excluding "transves-
tites" from protection under Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988).
140. 135 CONG. REC. S10772 (daily ed. Sep. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Helms).
141. See supra Section III.A.1.
142. See supra notes 129-130 and accompanying text.
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believed that it was not worthy of protection and, in the eleventh hour, the
ADA's sponsors and disability rights advocates reluctantly agreed to sacri-
fice the inclusion of GID in exchange for the ADA's passage in the Senate.143
Had there been a transgender lobby at the time and had social perceptions
of transgender people evolved, 144 the result may well have been different,
and the transgender community might have owed Armstrong far less "a
debt of gratitude." 145
The ADA's exclusion of GID has a powerful symbolic impact. As one
scholar recently commented, "[f]ederal law has an important expressive
function, especially concerning the messages it sends about disadvantaged
groups."146 The fact that Congress went out of its way to exclude GID,
along with nine mental impairments that involve some harm to oneself or
others, sends a strong message: people with GID have no civil rights wor-
thy of respect.147 Unlike homosexuality or bisexuality, GID is a mental im-
pairment, the ADA tells us. But unlike other mental impairments, GID is
dangerous, despicable, and undeserving of protection - like pedophilia,
kleptomania, and pyromania. GID is not good.
143. See supra Section III.C.
144. See Dallas Denny, Transgender Communities, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS, supra note 2 at
174, 183 (2006) (discussing rise of transgender lobby in mid-1990's, and gay, lesbian, and bi-
sexual support for transgender rights by early 2000's); see also A Blueprint for Equality: A Federal
Agenda for Transgender People, NATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY 2 (March 2012),
http://transequality.org/Resources/NCTE Blueprint for Equality2012_FINAL.pdf ("[1In
2003, transgender people barely had a foot in the door of the Washington offices where major
federal policy decisions take place. Now we're at every relevant meeting, and our impact is
felt at almost every table where our issues are discussed.").
145. 135 CONG. REC. S10785 (daily ed. Sep. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
146. Waterstone, supra note 19, at 1122.
147. See 42 U.S.C. § 12211 (2006); see also S. Elizabeth Malloy, Vhat Best to Protect Transsexu-
als from Discrimination: Using Current Legislation or Adopting a New Judicial Framework, 32 Wom-
en's Rts. L. Rep. 283, 299 (2011) (" [T~he ADA has instead served to legitimize discrimination
against transsexual individuals, not only by deliberately excluding them from protection, but
also by placing them in the same category as pedophiles, exhibitionists, and voyeurs."); id. at
319 (stating that exclusion of transgender people "from the ADA was effectively a codification
of the legal system's hostility towards them"); Colker, Homophobia, supra note 9 at 50 (noting
that "[t]he language concerning transvestites and transsexualism is . . . extremely derogatory"
because "[t]ranssexual and transvestite individuals are lumped together with individuals who
have 'sexual behavior disorders"'); Adrienne L. Hiegel, Note, Sexual Exclusions: The Americans
with Disabilities Act as Moral Code, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1451, 1479 (1994) ("[Tihe result of the
ADA's exclusion is not merely to allow private employers to take action against an employee
because of that employee's sexual behavior, but to do so with the state's blessing . . .
perpetuat[ing] the material, tangible discrimination against sexual minorities."); see also Pame-
la S. Karlan, Equal Protection, Due Process, and the Stereoscopic Fourteenth Amendment, 33
McGEORGE L. REV. 473, 485 (2002) ("The decision to exclude compulsive gamblers, kleptoma-
niacs, and pyromaniacs from the protections others enjoy surely reflects the majority's dislike
of these politically unpopular groups.").
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IV. GENDER IDENTITY DISORDER AND THE ADA AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2008:
DISABILITYQUEER
A. New Scope of Coverage
For nearly twenty years, the ADA was widely understood by courts and
society at large to protect a narrow class of people: "those" people with
impairments that impose severe functional limitations.148 Two Supreme
Court decisions were largely to blame for this development. First, in 1999,
in the case of Sutton v. United Airlines (and its two companion cases), the
Supreme Court held that the ameliorative effects of medication and other
measures must be considered in determining whether a person is disabled
under the ADA.149 As a result of Sutton, many people who experienced dis-
crimination because of an impairment were nevertheless unprotected by
the ADA because their impairments did not rise to the level of a "disabil-
ity" after taking into account ameliorative measures.150
Second, in 2002, in the case of Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc.
v. Williams, the Supreme Court held that the words "substantially limits"
and "major life activities" in the definition of disability "need to be inter-
preted strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled."
In order to qualify as a "disability," the Court stated, the impairment must
therefore "prevent[] or severely restrict[]" life functions.'5 These strict in-
terpretations effectively gutted the ADA, "narrow[ing] the broad scope of
protection intended to be afforded by the ADA, thus eliminating protection
for many individuals whom Congress intended to protect." 152
In 2008, Congress responded to these decisions by passing the ADA
148. See Barry, Toward Universalism, supra note 1, at 250.
149. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 488-89 (1999); see also Murphy v.
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999); Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555
(1999).
150. See Barry, Congress Intended, supra note 25 ("In the wake of Sutton, lower court deci-
sions struck down the claims of an electrician with muscular dystrophy whose conditional job
offer was revoked, in part, because he needed to use a ladder to reach items above his head, a
pharmacist who was denied a half-hour uninterrupted lunch break to manage his diabetes,
and a law enforcement officer who was fired after an examining physician determined that his
depression disqualified him from his job.... The Supreme Court had, in effect, created a tragic
paradox: the better you manage your medical condition, the less likely you are to be protected
from discrimination based on that condition.").
151. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 187-89, 197-98 (2002), superseded
by statute ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, 3554 [hereinafter
ADAAA]; see Barry, Congress Intended, supra note 25 ("Given this 'demanding standard,' lower
courts ruled against people with a wide range of impairments, including a woman with an
amputated arm, a man with a traumatic brain injury, a woman with stage III breast cancer, and
a young man with intellectual disabilities.").
152. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 2(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 Historical and Statutory
Notes; see also id. at § 2(a)(5).
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Amendments Act, "an attack on everything the Supreme Court and lower
courts had relied upon to unduly narrow the definition of disability."153
Through the Amendments, particularly the new-and-improved "regarded-
as" prong, Congress clarified that, with a few exceptions, anyone discrimi-
nated against (e.g., fired, not hired) based on an impairment is protected by
the ADA. 15 It does not matter if the person's impairment is episodic, miti-
gated by medication, not functionally limiting, or even non-existent.155 In
each case, that person is covered so long as an impairment (whether real or
perceived) was the reason for the discrimination. 156 Because everyone has
an impairment of one sort or another (or may be perceived as having one),
this means that everyone, with only a few exceptions, is entitled to legal
protection.157 Where the denial of a reasonable accommodation is at issue, a
person must show some limitation of a bodily function or life activity, but
the Amendments make clear that this showing is not a demanding one. 158
As a result of these changes, ADA protection is now nearly universal or,
one might say, "disabilityqueer."159 The ADA does not protect "those"
people with stigmatized impairments that impose severe functional limita-
tions; it protects all of us who are treated unfairly based on impairment,
whether or not our impairments are typically thought of as "disabilities." 160
153. Barry, Congress Intended, supra note 25.
154. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A) (2009) ("An individual meets the requirement of 'being re-
garded as having such an impairment' if the individual establishes that he or she has been sub-
jected to an action prohibited under this Act because of an actual or perceived physical or
mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life
activity."); id. at § 12102(3)(B) (exception for "transitory and minor" impairments); id. at §
12201(h) (exception for failure-to-accommodate cases).
155. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A) (2009) (stating that person is covered under "regarded as"
prong of definition of disability even if impairment does not substantially limit or is "per-
ceived," not "actual"); id. at (4)(D) (requiring that episodic impairments and impairments in
remission be considered in their active states); id. at (4)(E) (prohibiting consideration of most
mitigating measures); see also 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(j)(1)(vi) (2012) (discussing "regarded as"
prong).
156. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A) (2009); see also Barry, Toward Universalism, supra note 1, at
208 (discussing breadth of regarded-as prong under ADA Amendments Act).
157. See Barry, Toward Universalism, supra note 1, at 278-79. The Amendments' reconstitut-
ed regarded-as prong, in effect, converts the Americans with Disabilities Act into the Ameri-
cans with Impairments Act by "protect[ing] nearly anyone who is adversely treated based on
any impairment-whether the impairment is actual or perceived, and functionally limiting or
not." Barry, Congress Intended, supra note 25; see also Michelle A. Travis, Impairment as Protected
Status: A New Universality for Disability Rights, 46 GA. L. REV. 937, 984 (2012) ("[T]he ADAAA's
'regarded as' prong now prohibits nearly all forms of impairment-based discrimination.").
158. ADAAA § 2(b)(5) ("[T]he question of whether an individual's impairment is a disabil-
ity under the ADA should not demand extensive analysis.").
159. See Barry, Toward Universalism, supra note 1, at 208; see also supra note 16 and accompa-
nying text.
160. See id. at 278-79, 282; see also GLAD, TRANSGENDER LEGAL ISSUES, NEW ENGLAND 5
(2011), www.glad.org/uploads/docs/publications/trans-legal-issues.pdf (stating that "[tihe
term 'disability' in anti-discrimination laws ... is not used in the popular or colloquial sense,
and is not limited to individuals who are significantly debilitated or who appear outwardly
ill.").
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The newly amended ADA underscores that disability is not something
wrong with some of us -it is something wrong with the way society may
treat any of us.161
Take autism, for example. The autism spectrum is immensely broad
and includes those with "severe to profound intellectual disabilities" as
well as those "who are gifted and more competent than most in the com-
munity."162 All that an autistic person need show in order to be protected
under the ADA is that he or she was discriminated against based on au-
tism. 163 If the person is denied a reasonable accommodation based on au-
tism, the requisite showing is slightly different, but straightforward. 164 In
that case, the person must show that autism substantially limits a major
bodily function (like neurological or brain function) or a major life activity
(like thinking, concentrating, or social interaction).165 According to Con-
gress, this should not be difficult to do.166 In fact, according to the EEOC,
the agency charged with enforcing the ADA's employment provisions, au-
tism is now presumptively covered, as are major depressive disorder,
PTSD, obsessive compulsive disorder, and schizophrenia.167
Given autism's wide spectrum, the EEOC's presumptive protection of
autism underscores the ADA's broad scope of coverage.168 So far as the
EEOC is concerned, the ADA now covers not only the non-verbal eighteen-
year-old who exhibits self-injurious behavior, but also the socially awkward
professor not hired for a job.169 It covers the person who views autism as a
161. See id.
162. Kevin Barry, Gray Matters: Autism, Impairment, and the End of Binaries, 49 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 161, 169 (2012) (quoting Dr. Ami Klin). "Although the DSM-IV tries to distinguish vari-
ous points along the autism spectrum by providing diagnostic categories for various subtypes
of autism, such as Asperger's and PDD-NOS," the DSM-5 does away with subtypes in favor of
a single diagnosis: "Autism Spectrum Disorder." Id. at 170; see Autism Spectrum Disorder: Pro-
posed Revision, AM. PSYCHIATRIc ASS'N DSM-5 DEV. Proposed revisions are no longer available
online, but are on file with the author. Please see dsm5.org for the final version of the rule
[hereinafter Autism Spectrum Disorder, DSM-5 Proposed Revision].
163. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A) (2009) ("regarded as" prong).
164. See id. § 12201(h) (requiring that, when alleging failure to accommodate or to make
modifications to policies, practices, or procedures, plaintiffs show they actually are or were
substantially limited in a major life activity).
165. See id. § 12102(2) (defining "major life activity" to include "concentrating" and "think-
ing" as well as "the operation of a major bodily function" such as "neurological" and "brain"
functions); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(1) (2011) (stating that "[m]ajor life activities include, but are not
limited to ... interacting with others . .
166. See ADAAA § 2(b)(5).
167. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii) (2011) ("[I1t should easily be concluded that the follow-
ing types of impairments will, at a minimum, substantially limit the major life activities indi-
cated: ... autism substantially limits brain function ... major depressive disorder, bipolar dis-
order, post-traumatic stress disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder, and schizophrenia
substantially limit brain function.").
168. See id.
169. See supra note 160 and accompanying text (discussing autism's variability); cf U.S.
EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COM'N Press Release: Comfort Suites To Pay $132,500 For Disability
Discrimination Against Clerk With Autism (Nov. 7,2011), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/
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pathology in need of cure as well as the person who views autism as a form
of "neurodiversity" and therefore a difference to be celebrated.170
1. Same Moral Code
In 2008, Congress revisited the ADA and, in striking fashion, remedied a
host of problems with the ADA's definition of disability.71 But it did not
remedy all of them. When given the chance to do away with the GID ex-
clusion in 2008, Congress chose not to act - despite the presence of a na-
tional transgender lobby calling for an end to the exclusion,172 despite a
wave of legal changes acknowledging the injustices faced by transgender
people,173 despite refinement of the definition of GID under the DSM,174 and
despite a burgeoning social and political movement dedicated to helping
transgender people live in the world. 175
The reason that the ADAAA did not eliminate the GID exclusion is
straightforward, albeit unsatisfying. Political support for the ADAAA
(originally, the "ADA Restoration Act") depended on the bill's restoring-
not expanding- congressional intent.176 Because Congress clearly intended
newsroom/release/11-7-11a.cfm (discussing settlement of lawsuit against hotel operator who
refused to allow autistic hotel clerk assistance of job coach and subsequently fired clerk);
SIMON BARON-COHEN, THE ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCE: THE TRUTH ABOUT THE MALE AND FEMALE
BRAIN 163-64 (2003) (discussing award-winning professor of mathematics who is autistic).
170. See Barry, Gray Matters, supra note 162, at 186 ("The neurodiversity movement origi-
nated in the 1990s in response to the dominant conception of autism as a disorder and consists
primarily of generally high-functioning autistic adults and their families. . . . [Tihe
neurodiversity movement's central claim is that autism is not a disorder but a way of being or,
more specifically, a 'different' way of being, of thinking, of behaving.").
171. See ADAAA §4.
172. See Discrimination, NATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSCENDER EQUALITY,
http://transequality.org/Issues/discrimination.htm (last visited Dec. 11, 2012) ("In order to
make federal law consistent with the Employment Non-Discrimination Act [bill], Congress
should alter or remove problematic language regarding transgender individuals in the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act and related federal agency regulations."); cf. GLAD, supra note 160,
at 8 ("State disability anti-discrimination laws present an important tool to eradicate irrational
discrimination against transgender people in employment, housing, public accommodations
and other areas of law.").
173. See, e.g., Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-84, §4707, 123 Stat. 2838, 2839 (2009) (extending federal hate crimes protection to,
among other things, "gender identity"); Media Note, Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Dept. of
State, New Policy on Gender Change in Passports Announced (June 9, 2010),
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/06/14 29 2 2 .htm (stating that "[slexual reassign-
ment surgery is no longer a prerequisite" for issuance of U.S. passport"); see also infra notes
202-06 and accompanying text (discussing passage of state laws explicitly protecting people
from discrimination based on "gender identity" and federal court decisions protecting
transgender people under Title VII).
174. Compare DSM-IV-TR, supra note 34, at 576-82, with DSM-III-R, supra note 34, at 71-77.
175. See Denny, supra note 144, at 182-83 (discussing transgender political activism and ap-
pearance of transgender voices in books and films).
176. In this way, the ADA Amendments Act is like any other congressional override, the
purpose of which is to reject judicial interpretations of statutes deemed inconsistent with con-
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to exclude GID (and Transsexualism) from protection when it passed the
ADA in 1990, it would not have been a "restoration" to include those condi-
tions in 2008- it would have been an expansion. Disability rights advo-
cates therefore made the strategic decision to leave for another day the
problem of the ADA's exclusion of these impairments (and several other
problems with the ADA).177
Notwithstanding these political realities, Congress's refusal to address
the ADA's blanket exclusion of those with GID is deeply troubling. The
continued exclusion of GID flies in the face of the ADAAA's primary pur-
pose, which is to "reinstat[e] a broad scope of protection .. . available under
the ADA."1 78 Through its new-and-improved "regarded as" prong, the
amended ADA extends antidiscrimination protection to any individual dis-
criminated against based on any impairment unless the impairment is
"transitory and minor" or is one of those listed alongside GID. 179 While it
arguably made sense for Congress to continue to exclude certain impair-
ments that necessarily involve harm to oneself or others (such as exhibition-
ism, compulsive gambling, pyromania, and kleptomania), 80 and for Con-
gress to guard against a flood of potentially frivolous claims by excluding
"transitory and minor" impairments,181 the continued exclusion of GID is
nonsensical, offensive, and stigmatizing.182 GID has as little to do with pe-
dophilia as it does with the common cold, and should be covered by the
ADA.
gressional intent. See, e.g., Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2 § 181, 123
Stat. 5 (overriding Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007)); ADAAA
(overriding Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) and
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999)); Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-
166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (overriding six Supreme Court decisions); Civil Rights Restoration
Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988) (overriding Grove City v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555
(1984)); Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-506, 100 Stat. 1807 (overriding
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985)); Air Carrier Access Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-435, 100 Stat. 1080 (overriding United States Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of
Am., 477 U.S. 597 (1986)); Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-372,
100 Stat. 796 (overriding Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984)); see generally William N.
Eskeridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 332 & n.1 (1991) (discussing con-
gressional overrides of Supreme Court statutory interpretation decisions).
177. See Kevin Barry, Personal Notes on ADA Amendments Act Advocacy Effort; see also
Barry, Toward Universalism, supra note 1, at 251 n.292 ("Given the political difficulties associat-
ed with a broad legislative fix, disability rights advocates determined early on that the ADA
restoration effort ought to focus on what they believed was the biggest problem -the ADA's
scope of coverage.").
178. ADAAA § 2(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 Historical and Statutory Notes; see also 42 U.S.C. §
12102(4)(A) ("The definition of disability in this Act shall be construed in favor of broad cover-
age of individuals under this Act, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this Act.").
179. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A) (2009) ("regarded as" prong); id. at § 12102(3)(B) (exception for
"transitory and minor" impairments); id. at § 12211(b) (exception for GID and certain other
mental impairments).
180. See DSM-IV, supra note 34, at 525-26, 612-15.
181. See Barry, Toward Universalism, supra note 1, at 273 & n.410.
182. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
32 [Vol. 16
32
Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal, Vol. 16 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj/vol16/iss1/1
2013] Disabilityqueer: Federal Disability Rights Protection
Sometimes laws create the very thing they seek to dismantle. 8 3 The
2008 amendments to the ADA demonstrate the law's power to redress dis-
advantage by expanding protection for those treated unfairly based on their
impairments. At the same time, Congress's continued exclusion of GID
from protection under the ADA demonstrates the law's power to entrench
the disadvantage of people with GID. By refusing to cover GID, the ADA's
message to people with GID, and to the transgender community more
broadly, is now clearer than ever: nearly twenty years after the passage of
the ADA, they still have no civil rights worthy of respect. People with GID
are still despicable and even dangerous, and therefore undeserving of legal
protection under federal disability law.18" The ADA's moral code remains,
with GID retaining its last-place position in the hierarchy of mental im-
pairments.
V. FEDERAL PROTECTION FOR TRANSCENDER PEOPLE: THE "ADA INCLUSION
ACT"
The ADA's exclusion of GID in 1990 was based on nothing more than
the moral opprobrium of a small handful of senators, conveyed in the elev-
enth hour of a marathon floor debate and in the absence of an organized
transgender lobby. 8 5 In 2008, when Congress decided to expand the
ADA's definition of "disability" to protect more people, 186 things should
have been different for people with GID. Sadly, they were not. Instead of
removing the GID exclusion once and for all, Congress enshrined its moral
opposition toward people with GID by preserving the exclusion.
This should trouble those who seek true equality for transgender peo-
ple. While Congress's decision not to revisit the GID exclusion was under-
standable as a matter of politics, it was wrong as a matter of morality-a
set-back for the project of making transgender "good."187 The ADA should
be righted again through passage of a modest bill, the "ADA Inclusion
Act," which deletes the words "gender identity disorders not resulting
from physical impairments" and "transsexualism" from the ADA's list of
excluded impairments. 188
183. See CLAIRE H. LIACHOWITZ, DISABILITY AS A SOCIAL CONSrRUCr 107 (1988) (discussing
how laws "help to create disability").
184. See Levi & Klein, supra note 35, at 75 ("At the heart of the federal exclusion of
transgender people from the ADA lies bias, bigotry, and misunderstanding of transgender
people.").
185. See supra Section III.B.
186. See ADAAA §4.
187. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
188. This Article does not argue that "transvestism" should be deleted from the ADA's list
of excluded impairments. As discussed above, the impairments excluded from the ADA de-
rive from the DSM. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text. According to the DSM,
"Transvestism" (renamed "Transvestic Fetishism" under the DSM-1II-R (1987) and, under the
proposed DSM-5, now called "Transvestic Disorder") is highly specific-it refers to sexual
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An "ADA Inclusion Act" would no doubt face objections for a variety of
reasons and from a variety of constituencies, including the religious com-
munity.189 But the most salient objections would likely come from those
with a personal stake in a GID diagnosis, from members of the transgender
community "whose gender identity or expression does not conform to the
social expectations for their assigned sex at birth."190
Importantly, the transgender community is not a monolith. It includes
"transsexual" people who have undergone hormonal treatment or surgery
in order to align their anatomy and gender identity, people "who undergo
arousal from cross-dressing that results in significant distress or impairment. See Transvestic
Disorder: Proposed Revision, AM. PSYCHIATRIc Ass'N DSM-5 DEv. Proposed revisions are no
longer available online, but are on file with the author. Please see dsm5.org for the final ver-
sion of the rule ; see also Ray Blanchard, The DSM Diagnostic Criteria for Transvestic Fetishism,
available at http://www.dsm5.org/Documents/Sex%20and%20GID%2Lit%20Reviews/
Paraphilias/DSMV.TF.pdf (discussing changes to "Transvestism" in successive versions of
DSM). Importantly, "Transvestism" does not refer more broadly to cross-dressing absent sex-
ual arousal and distress, nor does it refer to GID. DSM-IV, supra note 34, at 536-37. Therefore,
while those with Transvestic Fetishism would continue to be excluded under the ADA, the
"ADA Inclusion Act" would likely protect cross-dressers (under the "regarded-as" prong, 42
U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A) (2006)) and, of course, people with GID.
One might argue that Transvestic Fetishism should not be excluded from protection under
the ADA because, unlike other sexual disorders such as voyeurism and pedophilia, it does not
involve either "the suffering or humiliation of oneself or one's partner" or "children or other
nonconsenting persons." See DSM-IV, supra note 34, at 522-23. Alternatively, one might argue
that Transvestic Fetishism should not be excluded because no sexual disorder should be ex-
cluded, given that the ADA already provides a "safety valve" that allows employers and busi-
nesses to discriminate against people who pose a "direct threat" to the health or safety of oth-
ers, see 42 U.S.C. §12113(b) (2006), and given that the exclusion unfairly deprives protection to
those who are "recovered" or are falsely perceived as having a sexual disorder (under the "re-
garded-as" prong), see id. §12102(3)(A). These arguments have much merit. Nevertheless, be-
cause "Transvestic Fetishism" is a "sexual disorder" under the DSM -as opposed to GID (and
Transsexualism), which is not -an argument for inclusion of Transvestic Fetishism implicates
the inclusion of other sexual disorders and, potentially, all of the remaining impairments ex-
cluded from the ADA. To avoid conflating support for inclusion of GID with support for in-
clusion of all sexual disorders, psychoactive substance abuse disorders, and certain impulse-
control disorders, the "ADA Inclusion Act" should target the "low-hanging fruit" and seek
inclusion of GID (and Transsexualism) only.
189. See, e.g., Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2009: Hearing on H.R. 3017 Before the H.
Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 111th Cong. 5 (2009) (written testimony of Craig L. Parshall, Senior
Vice-President and Gen'1 Counsel, Nat'l Religious Broadcasters), available at
http://democrats.edworkforce.house.gov/sites/democrats.edworkforce.house.gov/files/doc
uments/111/pdf/testimony/20090923CraigParshallTestimony.pdf ("Neither the Congress nor
the courts have jurisdiction over the religious beliefs of people of faith. ... Christian ministries
that object to those sexual preferences which are in clear violation of the standards of the Bible
are standing on a long and well-worn road."); see also 134 CONG. REC. S4236 (daily ed. Mar. 17,
1988) supra note 62 (statement of Sen. Helms). Religious arguments against GID inclusion
ought to have less force, especially in the employment context, given the ADA's explicit ex-
emption for religious entities, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 12113(d), 12187, and the Supreme Court's recog-
nition of the ministerial exception in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v.
E.E.O.C., 132 S. Ct. 694, 697 (2012), which bars the application of employment discrimination
laws to the "employment relationship between a religious institution and its ministers" under
the First Amendment. Id.
190. Currah et al., supra note 2, at xiv.
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no medical treatment but also take steps to conform their gender expres-
sions to meet their gender identities," 191 and the "Genderqueer" -i.e., those
who "redefine[] or play[] with gender, or who refuse[] gender altogether";
those "who bend/break the rules of gender and blur the boundaries" 92 and
"live outside of the gender norms of society."193
Given the diversity of the transgender community, transgender atti-
tudes toward GID are wide-ranging. Some transgender people, for exam-
ple, regard the misalignment of their anatomy and gender identity as a
mental impairment and accept the GID diagnosis. 194 Others attribute this
misalignment to differences in the brain or central nervous system and
therefore believe it to be a physical impairment.195 Still others reject the no-
tion of "impairment" altogether and argue instead for an understanding of
gender nonconformity as "a practice of self-determination, an exercise of
autonomy.. .. one among many human possibilities of determining one's
gender for oneself." 96 Echoing autism's neurodiversity movement, this
thread of the transgender community acknowledges the discomfort experi-
enced by transgender people, but attributes the discomfort to "something
caused purely by cultural prejudices rooted in gender stereotypes" -not
pathology.197 Some have even called for elimination of the GID diagnosis
altogether.198
While some members of the transgender community explicitly support
191. Levi & Klein, supra note 35, at 80. Not all those who take steps to conform their gen-
der expressions to meet their gender identities identify as transgender; some "identify simply
as men and women." U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., Guidance Regarding the Employment of
Transgender Individuals in the Federal Workplace (May 27, 2011), http://www.opm.gov/
diversity/Transgender/Guidance.asp.
192. LGBT Resources- Definition of Terms, GENDER EQUITY RESOURCE CENTER,
http://geneq.berkeley.edu/lgbt-resourcesdefiniton-of-terms#gender-queer.
193. Teaching Transgender, supra note 34, at 17.
194. See Levi & Klein, supra note 35, at 80-81.
195. See id. at 81, 84-85.
196. See Butler, Undiagnosing Gender, supra note 13, at 275.
197. See Levi & Klein, supra note 35, at 81.
198. See Butler, Undiagnosing Gender, supra note 13, at 275 (stating that "some activist psy-
chiatrists and trans people have argued that [GID] should be eliminated altogether"); see also
Denny, supra note 144, at 184(stating that "many transsexuals reject the medical model of
transsexualism" that "view[s] them as mentally ill"); H6bert, supra note 14, at 541 n.30
("[P]ortions of the transgender community object to the inclusion of gender identity disorder
in the DSM-IV-TR precisely because of the resulting categorization of gender identity disorder
as a mental illness and the resulting stigmatization."); GID (Adult), GID REFORM ADVOCATES,
www.gidreform.org/gid30285.html (advocating reform of GID diagnosis on grounds that it
"serves to confuse cultural nonconformity with mental illness and pathologize ordinary be-
haviors as symptomatic."); id. at www.gidreform.org ("It is time for the medical professionals
to affirm that difference is not disease, nonconformity is not pathology, and uniqueness is not
illness."); SHANNON MINTER & PHYLLIS RANDOLPH FRYE, GID AND THE TRANSGENDER
MOVEMENT: A JOINT STATEMENT BY THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON TRANSGENDER LAW
AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY (ICTLEP) AND THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS (NCLR)
(Nov. 14, 1996) [hereinafter JOINT STATEMENT], http://www.transgenderlegal.com/gid1.htm
(arguing that "transsexualism should become a medical rather than a psychiatric status.").
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GID's inclusion under the ADA, not all do.'1 For this thread of the
transgender community, the ADA Inclusion Act may be controversial for a
number of reasons.
A. "Disability Rights Protection is Infeasible and Unnecessary"
The most obvious objection is political: Congress is unlikely to revisit a
statute that they amended less than four years ago. This is especially true
given the direction of transgender policy in recent years, and even in recent
months, which points toward legal protections based on "sex" and "gender
identity" -not disability.200 In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, which held that Title VII's prohibition on "sex"
discrimination in the workplace extends to discrimination based on sex ste-
reotypes,201 a growing number of federal circuit and district courts have
held that Title VII protects transgender people based on their failure to ad-
199. Compare supra note 172 and accompanying text, with Jeannie J. Chung, Identity or Con-
dition?: The Theory and Practice of Applying State Disability Laws to Transgender Individuals, 21
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 35-36 (2011) ("[Ilt is highly likely that using disability laws will per-
petuate the medicalization of transgender individuals, that is, transgender individuals' contin-
ued reliance on the medical profession to obtain legal entitlements and protections on the basis
of their transgender status. . . . For this reason, disability anti-discrimination laws, with their
current emphasis on the medical model of disability, may do more harm than good for
transgender individuals."); id. at 36 (stating that application of state disability law to
transgender people "may further the pathologization of transgender individuals, since the
DSM-IV defines GID as a mental illness"), Malloy, supra note 147, at 300 ("Perhaps the most
controversial issue within the transsexual community with respect to disability anti-
discrimination laws concerns whether they should be considered disabled at all."), Rose, supra
note 9, at 436 n. 199 (noting lack of consensus "even among transsexuals, as to whether
[transsexualism] should be classified as a disability"), MINTER & FRYE, JOINT STATEMENT, Supra
note 198 (stating that "the disability rights model is [njeither the only [n]or the most effective
way to win civil rights protections for transgendered people," and that it "perpetuat[es] ... the
stereotype that transgendered people are inherently disturbed or unstable"), and supra note 198
and accompanying text.
200. Even assuming the political stars aligned in such a way as to allow for further
amendment of the ADA, many in the disability rights community might reasonably resist such
amendment for fear of opening the ADA to amendments that would make it more difficult for
people to assert their rights under the statute. One such proposed amendment would likely be
the ADA Notification Act, which has been introduced in seven consecutive Congresses. The
ADA Notification Act of 2011, H.R. 881, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011). This bill would prohibit a state
or federal court from exercising jurisdiction over an ADA Title III (public accommodations)
suit unless "the plaintiff provides the defendant with a written notice of ... the facts that con-
stitute the alleged violation" by registered mail, and ninety days (which may be extended up
to 120 days) elapses without the defendant correcting the alleged violation. Id.; see generally
Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Perversity of Limited Civil Rights Remedies: The Case of "Abusive" ADA
Litigation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1, 17 (2006) (discussing ADA Notification Act).
201. See 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) ("[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could evalu-
ate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their
group, for in forbidding to discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress in-
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here to the stereotypes associated with their assigned sex at birth.202 On
April 20, 2012, the EEOC issued a groundbreaking decision adopting the
reasoning of these courts and holding that "claims of discrimination based
on transgender status, also referred to as claims of discrimination based on
gender identity, are cognizable under Title VII's sex discrimination prohibi-
tion." 203 Title VII coverage for transgender people is now the official posi-
tion of the federal government.
Furthermore, sixteen states plus the District of Columbia, as well as over
150 cities and counties, have passed laws prohibiting discrimination based
on gender identity.204 And proposed federal legislation awaits. Since 2007,
the Employment Nondiscrimination Act (ENDA), a bill intended to prohib-
it employment discrimination based on "sexual orientation" and "gender
identity," has been introduced in Congress. 205 Given these channels of ex-
isting and potential legal protection, one might argue, the transgender
community does not need disability rights law. There are two responses to
202. See Ann C. Mcginley, Erasing Boundaries: Masculinities, Sexual Minorities, and Employ-
ment Discrimination, 43 U. MIcH. J.L. REFORM 713, 751-57 (2010) (discussing federal appeals
court decisions in which transgender workers were covered under Title VII). While a growing
number of courts have concluded that, under Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, Title VII prohibits
discrimination against transgender people based on their failure to comply with sex stereo-
types, courts almost universally agree that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination based on
an individual's transgender status alone. See id. at 732, 750. But see Schroer v. Billington, 577 F.
Supp. 2d 293, 306-07 (D.D.C. 2008) (holding that employer's refusal to hire person because she
was transsexual was "because of sex" and therefore prohibited under Title VII); see also Macy,
EEOC Appeal No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995 (April 20, 2012) ("Although most courts have
found protection for transgender people under Title VII under a theory of gender stereotyping,
evidence of gender stereotyping is simply one means of proving sex discrimination. . . . [W]e
conclude that intentional discrimination against a transgender individual because that person is
transgender is, by definition, discrimination 'based on . . . sex,' and such discrimination there-
fore violates Title VIl.") (emphasis added).
203. Macy, EEOC Appeal No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995 (April 20, 2012).
204. See Know Your Rights: Employment Discrimination and Transgender People, NATIONAL
CENTER FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY 1 (May 2012), http://transequality.org/Resources/
EmploymentKnowYourRightsMay20l2.pdf. On July 6, 2011, Connecticut became the fif-
teenth state to prohibit discrimination based on gender identity. Nan Hunter, Connecticut be-
comes 15th state to prohibit anti-trans discrimination, HUNTER OF JUsTIcE BLOG (uly 6, 2011),
http://hunterofjustice.com/2011/07/15th-state.html. Interestingly, while law student sup-
port for the bill was strong, it was not universal. Compare An Act Concerning Discrimination:
Hearing on H.B. 6599 Before the J. Comm. on the Judiciary, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2011) (tes-
timony of Ted Rucci, third-year law student, Quinnipiac University School of Law, On Behalf
of Quinnipiac University School of Law Q Alliance, Yale Law School Outlaws, and UConn
Law School Lambda Law Society (testifying in support of transgender civil rights bill on behalf
of all three of Connecticut's LGBT law student organizations), with An Act Concerning Discrim-
ination: Hearing on H.B. 6599 Before the J. Comm. on the Judiciary, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Conn.
2011) (testimony of James Bailey Brislin, second-year law student, Western New England Col-
lege School of Law) (testifying in opposition).
205. See, e.g., Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2011, H.R. 1397, 112th Cong. (2011);
see also Employment, Non-Discrimination Act: Legislative Timeline, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN,
www.hrc.org/resources/entry/employment-non-discrimination-act-legislative-timeline (trac-
ing history of ENDA bill from 1994 ["sexual orientation" only] to present [including "gender
identity"]).
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this objection.
1. The More Rights the Better
The first is straightforward: current antidiscrimination protection for
transgender people on the basis of "sex" and "gender identity" is precari-
ous at best. While both the EEOC and many courts have interpreted Price
Waterhouse to prohibit discrimination against transgender people under Ti-
tle VII,206 successfully making out a case of gender stereotyping is no easy
feat, especially where the case involves restroom usage or dressing and
grooming standards. 207 The ADA, by contrast, is well-suited to combat dis-
crimination against transgender people. 208 Unlike Title VII, the ADA ex-
plicitly defines discrimination to include the failure of an employer to
"mak[e] reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limi-
tations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability." 209 Such rea-
sonable accommodations might include, for example, temporarily modify-
ing policies governing restroom usage and dressing and grooming
standards, as well as modifying a person's work schedule or granting a
person leave to seek counseling, hormone therapy, electrolysis, reassign-
ment surgery, or other treatment. 210
206. See supra notes 202-203 and accompanying text.
207. See Mcginley, supra note 202, at 750, 757-61 (stating that while "transgender persons
may enjoy partial coverage [under Title VII] ... their method of proof is difficult and their ef-
forts are often unsuccessful" and noting cases in which courts ruled against transgender plain-
tiffs); see also Angela Clements, Sexual Orientation, Gender Nonconformity, and Trait-Based Dis-
crimination: Cautionary Tales from Title VII & An Argument for Inclusion, 24 BERKELEY J. GENDER
L. & JusT. 166, 180 (2009) ("The dress and grooming codes cases are the clearest example of
narrow protection for gender nonconformity under Title VII.").
208. Cf. Levi & Klein, supra note 35, at 74 n.1 (citing cases in which transgender people
were protected under state disability antidiscrimination laws); accord Chung, supra note 199, at
15 n.66.
209. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2006) (ADA Title I); see also 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2012)
("A public entity shall make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures
when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability . . .")
(Department of Justice regulations implementing ADA Title II); 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)
(2006) ("[D]iscrimination includes ... a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies,
practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities . . .")
(ADA Title III). Title VII contains a modest reasonable accommodation requirement, but only
for religion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2006) ("The term 'religion' includes all aspects of religious
observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable
to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or
practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business.").
210. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (2006) (defining "reasonable accommodation" to include
"job restructuring" and "part-time or modified work schedules"); 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630 App.
(2012) ("{O]ther accommodations could include permitting the use of accrued paid leave or
providing additional unpaid leave for necessary treatment. . ."). The question whether ADA
coverage of GID would force employer-provided health insurance plans to cover sex reas-
signment surgery (SRS) and other medical procedures relating to gender reassignment is a fas-
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Furthermore, Title VII and the proposed ENDA (which is still a long
way from passage)211 are not comprehensive. Unlike the ADA, they do not
extend beyond the workplace to all of the other places that intimately touch
transgender lives: the high school and the university, the department store
and the restaurant, the homeless shelter and the hotel, the adoption agency
and the foster home, the hospital and the senior citizen center, the health
club and the beauty shop, the bus station and the airport, the prison and the
police station, the department of social services and the registry of motor
vehicles. 212 State law, moreover, is a patchwork quilt, with some states ex-
tending broad protection to transgender people, others extending narrow
cinating and complex one. While a fulsome discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this
Article, some brief points are in order. Generally speaking, § 501(c)(3) of the ADA permits
health insurance plans to make disability-based distinctions- such as the exclusion of SRS- so
long as the plan is "bona fide" and its challenged disability-based distinction is not being used
as a "subterfuge to evade the purposes of [the ADA]." A plan is "bona fide" if "it exists and
pays benefits, and its terms have been accurately communicated to employees." THE U.S.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, NOTICE CONCERNING THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT AMENDMENTS ACt OF 2008, No. 915.002 § III(C)(1) (une 8, 1993),
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/health.html. A plan's disability-based distinction is not
being used as a "subterfuge" if it is "justified by the risks or costs associated with the disabil-
ity," for example, if the distinction: is attributable to increased risks (and thus increased cost to
the health insurance plan) of the disability, and not to the disability per se"; "would have been
so expensive as to cause the health insurance plan to become financially insolvent"; or would
result in "a drastic increase in premium payments (or in co-payments or deductibles), or a
drastic alteration to the scope of coverage or level of benefits provided ..... Id. § III(C)(2).
Although elimination of the ADA's GID exclusion would permit transgender people to chal-
lenge health insurance plans' GID-based distinctions, it is far from clear whether those chal-
lenges would be successful. See Amy Monahan & Daniel Schwarcz, Will Employers Undermine
Health Care Reform by Dumping Sick Employees?, 97 VA. L. REV. 125, 148-49 (2011) (stating that
ADA gives employers "a tremendous amount of discretion in carving out entire categories of
treatment, even if doing so would create disability-based distinctions, provided that such
treatments are in fact high-cost and will therefore create the needed actuarial data."); Hong,
supra note 46, at 96 (stating that "[mlany private insurance companies exclude [GIRS and hor-
mone treatments from their coverage" and "defend the exclusion clause ... as a reasonable
measure to contain costs and disallow superfluous procedures," but arguing that such clauses
are motivated by non-medical and non-fiscal criteria).
211. While passage of ENDA is likely inevitable, it will take some time. In 2007, the "last-
minute jitters [of] some Democrats" over ENDA's trans-inclusive language prompted Mem-
bers of Congress to introduce a "compromise" bill that stripped out "gender identity," fractur-
ing the coalition of transgender and gay rights organizations in the process. A Non-
Transgender-Inclusive ENDA? No Way!, NATIONAL GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE (Sep. 27, 2007)
http://www.thetaskforce.org/press/releases/prMF_092707. Neither the trans-inclusive nor
the sexual-orientation-only bill passed.
212. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006) (prohibiting discrimination in employment) and
Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2011, H.R. 1397, 112th Cong. § 4 (2011) (same), with
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 §§ 101-107, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (2006) (prohibit-
ing discrimination in employment), id. at §§ 201-245, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (prohibiting dis-
crimination in public services), and id. at §§ 301-309, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189 (prohibiting dis-
crimination by private entities that operate places of public accommodation). For an excellent
survey of the various forms of discrimination faced by transgender people, see generally,
INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN, supra note 18.
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protection, and most extending no protection.13
ADA coverage would therefore fill important gaps and provide another,
and surer, layer of needed protection. 214 To the extent that some redundan-
cies exist, overlapping protection is by no means new to antidiscrimination
law and is probably a good thing.215 While the political will to further
amend the ADA may be a long way off, that is no reason not to pursue it;
ENDA is a case in point and well worth the wait.
2. More than Rights: Transgender is "Good"
Second, and more importantly, even if transgender people were to win
robust legal protections through laws based on "sex" and "gender identi-
ty," they will have won only part of the battle. As Professor Feldblum ar-
gues, in order to achieve true equality for transgender people, "changing the
public's perception of the morality . .. of changing one's gender may ulti-
mately be necessary... "216 Transgender advocacy should therefore seek to
win more than rights to fair and equal treatment under sex and gender
identity discrimination law; it should seek to win hearts by showing that
transgender is "good." 217
To do this, transgender advocacy must rebut the moral case against
transgender people. The ADA should play a prominent role in this project
because the ADA's GID exclusion is the moral case against transgender
people; it is a moral attack that likens transgender people to people with
pedophilia and pyromania who are harmful to the health of the communi-
ty. 218 Rather than ceding the moral floor to the opponents of transgender
rights, advocates should seize on the GID exclusion to affirm and advance
the moral legitimacy of changing genders and otherwise defying gender
norms.
Consider the testimony of Kallista H. Solyn, a transgender woman in
Connecticut, who testified before Connecticut's Judiciary Committee in
213. See Scope of Explicitly Transgender-Inclusive Anti-Discrimination Laws, TRANSGENDER
LAW AND POLICY INSTITUTE & NATIONAL GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE (Aug. 1, 2008),
http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/fact-sheets/TI-antidisc-laws-708.pdf.
214. Cf. Levi & Klein, supra note 35, at 75 (arguing that "transgender persons who experi-
ence discrimination in employment, housing, public accommodations, and other areas fit neat-
ly within the definition of 'disability' used in modern civil rights laws").
215. The Rehabilitation Act and ADA, for example, target some of the same acts and actors.
See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 §§ 201-02, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-32 (2006) (amended
2009) (prohibiting discrimination by state and local government); Rehabilitation Act of 1973 §
504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006) (prohibiting discrimination by federally funded entities).
216. Feldblum, Gay is Good, supra note 137 at 141 (emphasis added).
217. See id.at 141-42 (arguing that lack of "[dlirect engagement with the issues of morality
surrounding either gay sex or gender identity ... represents a serious deficiency in our articu-
lation of the justification for LGBT equality").
218. See 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b).
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2011 in support of a state transgender civil rights bill.219 After fourteen
years of service to her employer, a privately owned aviation-related com-
pany, Ms. Solyn was terminated after informing her supervisor of her plans
to undergo gender reassignment surgery. "Within several days of disclos-
ing my intention to transition," Ms. Solyn explained, "I was asked, by the
firm's owners, to 'do the right thing for the sake of the company, and re-
sign.' I refused .... Being transgender is not a 'phase or a lifestyle.' I was
born this way and I can no more change my gender identity than I could
change the color of my skin."220
Ms. Solyn is not sick. In fact, she is not all that different from the rest of
us. She, like so many of us, wants to pursue her basic human capabilities,
that is, to "live a safe, well-nourished, productive, educated, social, and po-
litically and culturally participatory life of normal length."221 But, unlike
many of us, she cannot do so without changing her gender. While most of
will not undergo hormonal and surgical procedures to transition to the op-
posite sex, any one of us might choose that option if we could not fulfill our
basic human capabilities without doing so. One might also choose some-
thing less restrictive, "blend[ing] genders as if from a palette."222 One
might choose to "transition gender roles without a goal of genital surgery,
acknowledge one's gender dysphoria and yet remain in one's original gen-
der role, to take hormones for a while and then stop, [or] be a woman with
breasts and a penis or a man with a vagina ... .
No matter which path one chooses, nonconformance with gender norms
does not destroy community - it perfects it by allowing members of the
community to pursue their capabilities to the maximum extent. When
viewed in this way, the moral case against transgender people, one might
reasonably argue, is little more than a failure of empathy.
B. "Disability Rights Protection Stigmatizes Transgender People By
Labeling Them 'Disabled"'
Even if one were to agree that transgender advocacy ought to make the
moral case for transgender equality, one might reasonably argue that GID's
inclusion under the ADA is not the right way to do it. Disability rights law
cannot make gender nonconformity "good," the argument goes, because
disability is never good.224 According to this view, disability refers to im-
219. An Act Concerning Discrimination: Hearing on H.B. 6599 Before the Judiciary Committee,
2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ct. 2011) (statement of Kallista H. Solyn, constituent).
220. Id.
221. Feldblum, Gay is Good, supra note 137, at 158 n.57 (citing Robin L. West, Rights, Capabil-
ities and the Good Society, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1901,1902 (2001)).
222. Denny, supra note 144, at 182
223. Id.
224. See Emens, supra note 16, at 227, 230 (discussing "the highly negative social status of
disability" as compared with other protected classes like race or sex, and stating that
41
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pairments that are stigmatized - those that impose functional limitations
that render people "abnormal or defective in mind or body."225 At best, all
that disability rights law can do is make transgender people the objects of
pity. Rather than aid transgender people's rise from the ranks of morally
harmful (the first moral view) to good (the third moral view), GID's inclu-
sion would lock them in disability's stigmatizing limbo: those people with
"unfortunate, abnormal health conditions" who are neither good nor harm-
ful to the community (the second moral view).226
This argument ignores the impact of the ADA Amendments Act of 2008
(ADAAA), which significantly expands the ADA's definition of disability
in two ways. First, in cases that do not involve a request for reasonable ac-
commodation, the ADAAA clarifies that a person is "disabled" if the per-
son is treated adversely because of an impairment -whether that impair-
ment is real or perceived, and whether it actually limits major life activities or
not.2 2 7 "No-one's body works perfectly, or consistently, or eternally. We
are all in some way impaired."2 8 Since all of us have impairments of one
sort or another,n 9 and since any of us can be regarded as having an im-
pairment of one sort or another, the ADA now covers all of us.230 Disability
coverage is therefore not stigmatizing -at long last, it is something broadly
shared.231
Second, while those seeking reasonable accommodations must still show
that their impairments "substantially limit" their "major life activities," the
ADAAA significantly reduces this threshold showing.232 Recent caselaw
under the ADAAA tells the story: ankle injuries,233 anxiety disorder,? back
"[d]isability is rarely understood as a positive state or identity with social or cultural benefits
to its bearers or those around them").
225. See Bagenstos, supra note 26, at 437, 444 (2000) (discussing the minority group ap-
proach to disability, which locates disability in a discrete group of people whose medical im-
pairments are "stigmatized," that is, those who "differ too much from a socially defined
'norm,'" such that they are considered "abnormal or defective in mind or body.").
226. Feldblum, Moral Conflict, supra note 137, at 69-70.
227. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A) (2006).
228. Tom Shakespeare & Nicholas Watson, The Social Model of Disability: An Outdated Ideol-
ogy?, in 2 RES. IN SoC. SCI. & DISABILITY 9, 24 (Sharon N. Barnartt & Barbara M. Altman eds.,
2001).
229. See id. at 24-25 ("[T]here is no qualitative difference between disabled people and non-
disabled people, because we are all impaired. Impairment is not the core component of disabil-
ity . . . , it is the inherent nature of humanity. For example, the Human Genome Project has
shown that every individual's genome contains mutations[, such] as predispositions to late
onset diseases such as cancer, heart disease and dementia .... [E]veryone has limitations, and .
. . everyone is vulnerable to more limitations and will, through the ageing process, inevitably
experience functional loss and morbidity.").
230. Barry, Toward Universalism, supra note 1, at 278-79.
231. See id.
232. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4) (2006).
233. Fleck v. Wilmac Corp., No. 10-05562, 2011 WL 1899198, at *5-6 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (deny-
ing employer's motion to dismiss).
234. Gesegnet v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., No. 3:09-CV-828-H, 2011 WL 2119248, at *4
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injuries, 35 bipolar disorder,236 broken legs,237 carpal tunnel syndrome,238
depression,239 diabetes, 240 eating disorders,241 gastrointestinal problems,242
insomnia,243 monocular vision,244 obesity,245 pain in the hands, joints, and
hip,246 psoriatic arthritiS, 247 and stuttering248 can all be covered under the
ADA. These are not the sort of impairments that are considered to be par-
ticularly unfortunate or abnormal, and yet the ADA considers them "disa-
bilities" all the same. Thanks to the 2008 amendments, the ADA is now
"disabilityqueer": it rightly blurs the line between the healthy "us" and the
unfortunate "disabled" by focusing on how attitudes -not impairments -
limit people's lives. 249 Because the newly amended ADA covers nearly all
(W.D. Ky. 2011) (assuming disability but granting employer's motion for summary judgment
based on employee's failure to adequately request reasonable accommodation).
235. Cohen v. CHLN, Inc., No. 10-00514, 2011 WL 2713737, at *8 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (denying
employer's motion for summary judgment).
236. Gesegnet, 2011 WL 2119248, at *4 (assuming disability but granting employer's motion
for summary judgment based on employee's failure to adequately request reasonable accom-
modation).
237. Patton v. Ecardio Diagnostics LLC, 793 F. Supp. 2d 964, 968-69 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (deny-
ing employer's motion for summary judgment).
238. Gibbs v. ADS Alliance Data Systems, Inc., No. 10-2421-JWL, 2011 WL 3205779, at *3
(D. Kan. 2011) (denying employer's motion for summary judgment).
239. Naber v. Dover Healthcare Associates, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 2d 622, 646-47 (D. Del. 2011)
(finding issue of fact as to disability but granting employer's motion for summary judgment
because employee failed to show that legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for termination
was pretextual); Kinney v. Century Serv. Corp. II, No. 1:10-cv-00787-JMS-DML, 2011 WL
3476569, at *10 (S.D. Ind. 2011) (denying employer's motion for summary judgment).
240. See Rohr v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 555 F.3d 850, 861-62
(9th Cir. 2009) (finding issue of fact as to disability under ADA and noting that ADAAA "bol-
stered" this conclusion, and reversing grant of summary judgment to employer).
241. Franchi v. New Hampton School, 656 F. Supp. 2d 252, 258-59 (D.N.H. 2009) (denying
school district's motion to dismiss as to claim of disability).
242. Wells v. Cincinnati Children's Hosp. Medical Center, 860 F.Supp.2d 469, 477478 (S.D.
Ohio 2012) (denying employer's motion for summary judgment).
243. See Beveridge v. HD Supply Waterworks, L.T.D., No. 7:08-CV-52 (HL), 2009 WL
4755370, at *5 n.8 (M.D. Ga. 2009) (stating that "under [ADA's] broadened definition, [an em-
ployee with insomnia] would likely be successful in proving he was 'regarded as' disabled"
based on his termination four days after falling asleep at work).
244. Markham v. Boeing Company, No.10-1363-MLB, 2011 WL 6217117, at *4-5 & n.8 (D.
Kan. 2011) (finding issue of fact as to disability but granting employer's motion for summary
judgment because employee failed to offer sufficient evidence of causation or pretext); Gil v.
Vortex, LLC, 697 F. Supp. 2d 234, 23941 (D. Mass. 2010) (denying employer's motion to dis-
miss).
245. Lowe v. American Eurocopter, LLC, No. 1:10CV24-A-D, 2010 WL 5232523, at *7-8
(N.D. Miss. 2010) (denying employer's motion to dismiss).
246. Gaus v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co., No. 09-1698, 2011 WL 4527359, at *17 (W.D. Pa.
2011) (denying employer's motion for summary judgment).
247. See Carmona v. Southwest Airlines Co., 604 F.3d 848, 855, 859 (5th Cir. 2010) (stating
that amendments to ADA "would be very favorable to [plaintiffs] case if they are applicable,
because they make it easier for a plaintiff with an episodic condition [like psoriatic arthritis] .
to establish that he is an 'individual with a disability"').
248. Medvic v. Compass Sign Co., LLC, No. 10-5222, 2011 WL 3513499, at *7 (E.D. Pa. 2011)
(denying employer's motion for summary judgment).
249. See 154 CONG. REC. S8843 (daily ed. Sep. 16, 2008) (Statement of Managers) ("The
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impairments, not just those typically considered to be "disabilities," there is
good reason for GID to be within that scope of coverage. 250
C. "Disability Rights Protection Stigmatizes Transgender People by
Legitimating the GID Diagnosis"
But what about those who do not believe that GID is an impairment at
all-would GID's inclusion under the ADA stigmatize transgender people
by legitimating the GID diagnosis? This is a harder question. As many
commentators have noted, "[b]eing transgender is a quintessentially stig-
matic condition. . . ."251 People who do not adhere to gender norms are
considered the epitome of "abnormal": neglect, prejudice, and stereotypes
are hallmarks of their experience; murder, suicide, homelessness, jobless-
ness, and poverty are tragically common in their community. 252
The GID diagnosis plays a paradoxical role with regard to stigma. On
the one hand, it alleviates suffering by "facilitat[ing] access to medical and
technological means for transitioning. . . . [1It makes life livable." 253 But the
diagnosis also comes at a price. As Professor Judith Butler writes,
[GID] subscribes to forms of psychological assessment that assume
that the diagnosed person is affected by forces he or she does not
[ADAAA] ... ensures that the emphasis in questions of disability discrimination is properly
on the critical inquiry of whether a qualified person has been discriminated against on the ba-
sis of disability, and not unduly focused on the preliminary question of whether a particular
person is a 'person with a disability.'"); see also Barry, Toward Universalism, supra note 1, at 278.
250. See GLAD, supra note 160, at 6 & n.4 ("Misunderstandings about the term 'disability,'
and the stigma associated with disability, should not prevent people's access to the courts and
other protections ... . Rather than restrict the valid legal options of transgender people [under
disability law], work must be done to eliminate the stigma associated with disability."); see also
Chung, supra note 199, 34 (stating that "applying disability laws to individuals not'traditional-
ly' thought of as disabled," like transgender people, "advances a more dynamic interpretation
of disability anti-discrimination statutes").
251. Levi & Klein, supra note 35, at 88.
252. According to a 2011 survey of transgender individuals conducted by the National
Center for Transgender Equality and the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, survey re-
spondents were "nearly four times more likely to have a household income of less than
$10,000/year compared to the general population" and experienced unemployment and
homelessness at twice the rate of the general population. Also, "41% of respondents reported
attempting suicide compared to 1.6% of the general population" and nearly all reported some
form of discrimination or harassment - in school and at work, and in housing, healthcare, and
public accommodations. INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN, supra note 18, at 2. International
Transgender Day of Remembrance is held each year on November 20 to memorialize members
of the Transgender community who have been murdered. See The Matthew Shepard Hate Crimes
Prevention Act: Hearing on S. 909, Before the S. Comm. on Judiciary, 111t Cong. 1 (2009) (statement
of the National Center for Transgender Equality), available at http://transequality.org/PDFs/
S909_NCTEtestimony.pdf ("The transgender community has anecdotally reported on more
than one bias motivated murder of a transgender person per month over the past few dec-
ades.").
253. Butler, supra note 13, at 274, 285.
44 [Vol. 16
44
Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal, Vol. 16 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj/vol16/iss1/1
2013] Disabilityqueer: Federal Disability Rights Protection
understand; it assumes that there is delusion or dysphoria in such
people; it assumes that certain gender norms have not been proper-
ly embodied and that an error and a failure have taken place; it
makes assumptions about fathers and mothers, and what normal
family life is and should have been; it assumes the language of cor-
rection, adaptation, and normalization; it seeks to uphold the gen-
der norms of the world as it is currently constituted and tends to
pathologize any effort to produce gender in ways that fail to con-
form to existing norms ... .2
As a result, the diagnosis "takes on a life of its own, . . . mak[ing] life
harder for those who suffer by being pathologized and who lose certain
rights and liberties, including child custody, employment, and housing, by
virtue of the stigma attached to the diagnosis . . . ."255 According to Profes-
sor Butler, the "pathologizing force" of the GID diagnosis can disable - and
even kill-transgender people by "mak[ing] them feel in a stigmatized po-
sition and, in some cases, contribut[ing] to a suicidal conclusion."2 6 With
good reason, many in the transgender community have sought to eliminate
GID as a DSM diagnosis altogether, just as the gay community successfully
did with homosexuality years ago.257
1. The ADA Already Recognizes GID as an Impairment
The stigma surrounding a GID diagnosis should not be underestimated,
and the stakes are high.258 While the GID diagnosis no doubt plays a role in
254. Id. at 275.
255. Id. at 285; see also INJusTiCE AT EVERY TURN, supra note 18, at 197 (noting "perceived
stigma attached with [gender-related] mental health diagnoses").
256. Butler, supra note 13, at 276; see also id. 295 (" [Olne has to ask whether the diagnosis of
transgendered youth does not act precisely as peer pressure, as an elevated form of teasing, as
a euphemized form of social violence."). For a thoughtful discussion of the promise and prob-
lems inherent in the overlap between disability rights and transgender rights, see Dean Spade,
Resisting Medicine, Re/Modeling Gender, 18 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 15, 35 (2003) ("I do not want
to make trans rights dependent upon GID diagnoses, because such diagnoses are not accessi-
ble to many low income people; because I believe that the diagnostic and treatment processes
for GID are regulatory and promote a regime of coercive binary gender; and because I believe
that CID is still being misused by some mental health practitioners as a basis for involuntary
psychiatric treatment for gender transgressive people. I do not want to legitimize those prac-
tices through my reliance on the medical approach to gender nonconformity.").
257. Compare Chung, Identity or Condition?, supra note 199 (discussing transgender commu-
nity's opposition to CID diagnosis), with KUTCHINS & KIRK, supra note 3, at 71-72 (explaining
history of gay liberation movement's successful efforts to delete homosexuality from DSM in
1974).
258. See Butler, supra note 13, at 276; cf KUTCHINS & KIRK, supra note 3, at 77 ("If homosex-
uality were still considered a mental illness, business and insurance companes would not be
offering health coverage for domestic partners, the army would still be using psychiatry to
screen suspected homosexuals for discharge, and many of the other advances in gay rights
would not be part of our culture."); id. at 61-62 (discussing transformation of homosexuality
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the stigmatization of transgender people, ADA coverage of GID would do
nothing to further its legitimacy -at least nothing more than the ADA does
at present. Unlike homosexuality and bisexuality, which the ADA states
"are not impairments and as such are not disabilities," the ADA states only
that GID is not a covered "disability." 25 9 Implicitly, the ADA therefore al-
ready recognizes that GID is an impairment, but refuses to cover GID by
stating that it is not a "disability" (only "disabilities" are covered under the
ADA-not impairments). 260 The only change made by the ADA Inclusion
Act would be to allow GID to be considered a covered "disability."
But this textual argument aside, the risk of stigmatizing transgender
people by covering them under the law seems far outweighed by the stig-
ma that attaches to their continued exclusion under the law. While it is
possible that GID coverage might stigmatize transgender people by some-
how strengthening the "status" of the GID diagnosis, it is more likely that
the ADA's exclusion of GID currently stigmatizes transgender people by
marking them as undeserving of legal protection. 261 This is especially true
given that Congress did nothing to change the GID exclusion when it ex-
panded the definition of "disability" in 2008.262 Having the law on one's
side seems far less stigmatizing than having a law that continues to group
GID with pyromania and pedophilia and permits discrimination with im-
punity. In fact, it is these very prejudices and stereotypes that the ADA is
designed to remedy. As Professor Levi notes, "[tbo avoid relying on disabil-
ity law for protections because of stigma would exacerbate the problem the
laws seek to redress." 263
2. Social Construction is Not a Reason to Deprive Legal Protection
Another argument against disability rights protection for GID is that
GID is a social construction, not an impairment. The problem with this ar-
gument is that all impairments - both physical and mental - are, to a certain
extent, socially constructed. All impairments are named and diagnosed,
and the process of naming and diagnosis are social, and therefore contin-
from something "on which most traditional moral opprobrium rested" to something "good"
following removal of homosexuality from DSM, and stating that "[nlo longer was the problem
an individual moral struggle to overcome temptation and avoid sin or a psychological struggle
to overcome overwhelming desires") (internal quotation marks omitted).
259. 42 U.S.C. § 12211(a)-(b) (2006) (emphasis added).
260. Id. § 12211(b).
261. See id.; see also Hiegel, supra note 147, at 1,453 ("By leaving open a space of permissive
employer discrimination, the Act identifies the sexual 'deviant' as the new pariah, using the
legal machinery of the state to mark as outsiders those whose noncompliant body renders
them unfit for full integration into a working community.").
262. See supra section IV.A.1.
263. Jennifer L. Levi, Clothes Don't Make the Man (or Woman), But Gender Might, 15
COLUMBIA J. GENDER & L. 90, 106 (2006).
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gent, exercises. 264 Autism, for example, need never have been named and
diagnosed. 265 Children exhibiting the subjective behavioral features we
now call autism could have been diagnosed with "childhood schizophre-
nia" or need never have been diagnosed at all. 266 These same contingencies
apply to GID, which has been named and renamed over the years (from
"Transsexualism" in the DSM-III-R to "Gender Identity Disorder" in the
DSM-IV to "Gender Dysphoria" in the proposed DSM-5), and which is di-
agnosed based on subjective behavioral criteria.267 The fact that impair-
ments are socially constructed, by itself, does not justify withholding legal
protection.
"No," some might further argue, "autism is 'real,' while GID is not."
What they mean is that GID does not refer to some objectively-measurable
biological pathology and, therefore, it is not an impairment but rather the
pathologizing of a perfectly healthy way of being. 268 According to this rea-
soning, however, autism (and many other mental impairments) is not an
"impairment" either. While the discovery of some biological pathology
underlying autism appears likely, there is none yet.269 And there are plenty
of autistic people (i.e., the neurodiversity movement) who, like many in the
transgender community, resist the pathologizing of autism and instead re-
cast autism as a different way of thinking and being that should not be
cured or normalized. 270 Given that both autism and GID lack an objective-
ly-measurable pathology, and given that many members of both communi-
ties regard these "impairments" as different ways of being, why should the
law treat them differently?
"Okay, then," one might further argue, "the ADA should exclude both
autism and GID because neither is an impairment." Rather than amending
the ADA to treat GID and autism as protected impairments, the argument
goes, the ADA ought to be amended to treat GID and autism the same as
homosexuality and bisexuality, that is, as not impairments at all. 271 But this
argument also misses its mark. Autism and GID do not cease being im-
pairments because many of those classified as having these conditions do
264. See Barry, Gray Matters, supra note 162, at 204-05.
265. See id. at 209.
266. See id.
267. See Gender Dysphoria, DSM-5 Proposed Revision, supra note 3; DSM-IV, supra note 34, at
532-38; DSM-Ill-R, supra note 34, at 74-76.
268. Cf Butler, supra note 13, at 275 ("[T]he diagnosis [of GID] is adamantly opposed be-
cause it continues to pathologize as a mental disorder what ought to be understood instead as
one among many human possibilities of determining one's gender for oneself.").
269. See Barry, Gray Matters, supra note 162, at 168, 173-74.
270. See id. at 186-89; see also Malloy, supra note 147, at 301 ("Some [transgender] activists
contend that th[e disability] categorization is demeaning and stereotypical because it implies
that transsexual individuals are not normal. In this regard, the transsexual community is not
alone; individuals in existing disabled groups, such as paraplegics and the deaf, are also re-
sistant to being characterized as such.") (citation omitted).
271. See 42 U.S.C. 12211(a) (2006).
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not consider them to be impairments. The medical establishment, of
course, continues to believe that autism and GID are impairmentS272 but,
more importantly, so do many of those diagnosed. The lived experiences of
those classified as having these conditions are not universal. While the
neurodiverse may resist the pathologizing of autism, forego medical
"treatment" such as Applied Behavioral Analysis, and advocate against
"cures," many parents of autistic children may do just the opposite. 273
Likewise, while many transgender people resist the GID diagnosis and
forego hormonal treatment and surgery to align their anatomy with their
gender identity, many others seek out the diagnosis and treatment for it.274
Rejecting the GID diagnosis is therefore not a principled reason for with-
holding legal protection for GID-it merely favors one side's experience
over another's.
D. "Disability Rights Protection Would be Underinclusive"
Another argument against disability rights protection for GID is that it is
bound to be under-inclusive. The ADA Inclusion Act would most likely
cover a person diagnosed with GID whose distress substantially limits the
person's brain function or ability to sleep, eat, or concentrate, whose life-
long medical treatment (or attendant side effects) substantially limits the
person's ability to "car[e] for oneself," or whose genital surgery substantial-
ly limits "the operation of . . . reproductive functions." 275 But, one might
argue, it probably would not cover transgender people who do not have the
diagnosis because they do not want it, 2 76 because they do not meet the di-
agnostic criteria, or because they lack access to the medical system that
provides such a diagnosis. 27
This argument fails to account for recent changes to the law. As dis-
cussed above, the 2008 amendments make clear that the ADA covers nearly
anyone who is "disabled" (i.e., adversely treated) based on an impairment,
272. Autism Spectrum Disorder, DSM-5 Proposed Revision, supra note 3.
273. See Barry, Gray Matters, supra note 162, at 171-72, 186.
274. See Butler, supra note 13, at 274-75.
275. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)(2006) ("[Miajor life activities include, but are not limited to,
caring for oneself, eating, sleeping ... concentrating . . . ."); id. § 12102(2)(B) ("[A] major life
activity also includes the operation of a major bodily function, including but not limited to ...
reproductive functions.").
276. See Butler, supra note 13, at 275.
277. See Franklin H. Romeo, Beyond a Medical Model: Advocating for a New Conception of Gen-
der Identity in the Law, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 713, 730 (2005) (stating that "[l]ow-income
transgender people who are unable to afford trans-friendly healthcare ... are unlikely to be
able to avail themselves of legal protections that have emerged" from courts' reliance on diag-
nosis of GID); see also About Us, THE JIM COLLINs FOUNDATION, http://jimcollinsfoundation.
org/?page id=34 (last visited Dec. 11, 2012) (dedicated to "rais[ing] money to fund gender-
confirming surgeries for those transgender people who need surgery to live a healthy life, but
have no ability to pay for it themselves").
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whether that impairment is real or perceived, limiting or not.278 A
transgender man who does not seek out a GID diagnosis or otherwise avail
himself of medical interventions (and would not qualify for a GID diagno-
sis even if he did), and who is not functionally limited in any way, but who
dresses in traditionally male clothing and is discriminated against as a re-
sult, is most likely "regarded as" having GID. 279 The ADA Inclusion Act
would most likely cover him. 280
As other commentators have noted, this argument also ignores "a tru-
ism of a limitation of disability antidiscrimination laws generally," which is
that not all people will be found "disabled."281 While the 2008 amendments
drastically lower the bar for legal protection, this truism remains. "This is
not a reason, however, to forego pursuing critical nondiscrimination protec-
tions for those transgender people who can meet the definition of disabil-
ity."282 Consider autism's vast spectrum, where some autistic people are
profoundly limited in their life functioning (e.g., self-care, speaking), and
others are not.283 Consider also the neurodiversity movement's outer rim,
the so-called "autistic cousins" (i.e., non-autistic people with significant so-
cial and communication abnormalities that render them significantly "autis-
tic-like"). 284 While "cousins," and even some high-functioning autistic peo-
ple, will inevitably be denied accommodations under the amended ADA, 285
the neurodiversity movement does not-and should not-suggest that au-
tism should not be protected under the law. The same reasoning arguably
applies to the transgender community and GID.
VI. CONCLUSION
When the ADA was signed into law in 1990, President George H.W.
278. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A) (2009).
279. See id.
280. Unlike a person with GID who is substantially limited in a major life activity, a person
"regarded as" having GID would not be entitled to a reasonable accommodation. 42 U.S.C. §
12201(h) (2006).
281. Levi & Klein, supra note 35, at 87.
282. Id.
283. See supra note 162 and accompanying text; cf. SIMON BARON-COHEN, supra note 169, at
163-64.
284. See Jim Sinclair, Autism Network International: The Development of a Community and its
Culture, AuTIsM NETWORK INTERNATIONAL (Jan. 2005), http://www.autreat.com/History
ofANI.html. Mirroring the breadth of the neurodiversity and transgender communities, the
Deaf community includes those without hearing impairments. See Harlan Lane, Constructions
of Deafness, 10 DISABILITY & SOC'Y 171, 179 (1995) ("The claim that one is in the DEAF-WORLD,
or that someone else is, is not a claim about hearing status at all. . . . All degrees of hearing can
be found among Deaf people ... and most people who are hearing-impaired are not members
of the DEAF-WORLD.").
285. See Daniela Caruso, Autism in the U.S.: Social Movement and Legal Change, 36 AM. J.L. &




Barry: Disabilityqueer: Federal Disability Rights Protection for Transgender People
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2013
YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J.
Bush announced that the law would "take[] a sledgehammer to ... the
shameful wall of exclusion" separating people with various impairments
from "the rich mosaic of the American mainstream." 286 Importantly, the
ADA did not remove that wall for everyone. On the eve of passage in the
Senate, the ADA's sponsors struck a fateful bargain with several senators,
which maintained the wall for people with GID, pedophilia, pyromania,
kleptomania, and several other mental impairments considered "immoral,
improper, or illegal."287 From its inception, the ADA was a moral code that
excluded from protection those impairments considered morally harmful.
In the years that followed, members of the transgender community coa-
lesced into a formidable political and social movement demanding access to
America's mainstream. Their advocacy has done much to raise the pro-
file - and morality - of gender nonconformance. The shameful wall exclud-
ing transgender people is falling. Transgender is finally becoming "good."
While legal protections have played an important role in this develop-
ment, federal disability law is a notable exception. When Congress decided
to expand the definition of "disability" in 2008 to include nearly everyone,
rendering the ADA "disabilityqueer," Congress deliberately chose not to
revisit the GID exclusion. Far from removing the wall of exclusion for
transgender people, the 2008 amendments reinforced it. Legal advance-
ments outside of disability law, including a resounding victory before the
EEOC in April 2012, have burst holes in the wall. Yet the ADA's GID exclu-
sion still stands -a monument to moral opposition toward gender noncon-
formity, a bulwark against true transgender equality.
Reasonable arguments against federal disability protection for GID can
surely be made. One might argue, for example, that disability protection is
not needed or is under-inclusive, or that disability protection is itself stig-
matizing. But none of these arguments squarely rebut the moral opposition
underlying GID's exclusion from the ADA, nor do they adequately account
for the 2008 amendments' expansion of what it means to be "disabled." An
"ADA Inclusion Act" would advance transgender policy by removing gen-
der nonconforming people from the ranks of the morally dangerous and
providing them with the same protection as nearly everyone else who is
discriminated against based on impairment.
The shameful wall of exclusion for transgender people will fall, and true
equality for transgender people will come, when the moral case against
transgender equality is exposed for what it is -a failure of empathy. Re-
moval of the ADA's GID exclusion, a prominent piece of that wall, ought to
be part of the project of making transgender "good."
286. George H.W. Bush, Remarks at the Signing of the Americans with Disabilities Act (Ju-
ly 26, 1990), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/videos/ada-signing-text
.html.
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